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Lessons for senior investigators 
The results suggest that investigators 
should take into account the duration of 
an investigation when confronted by 
competing demands of new and existing 
jobs. 
The type of assets involved in the case is 
also predictive of the probability of 
success. Both these factors should be 
used to assist expert opinion rather than 
replace it. 
Lessons for senior police/policymakers 
The actual amount of proceeds of crime 
collected is important for accounting 
purposes; however, it is a poor measure 
of the value of proceeds of crime action. 
POCDDI is a more realistic indicator of 
this value and is important in measuring 
the efficiency and effectiveness of 
proceeds of crime activity. It also 
provides a better basis for resource 
allocation and accountability to the 
government and the community. 
Results – factors affecting success 
• The more time a financial investigation 
takes the less the likelihood of a successful 
outcome. The odds of success reduce by 
one-third every 12 months. 
• Some classes of assets have a higher 
probability of success (cash, shares, 
commercial property) than others 
(residences, cars, boats). 
Results – measuring disruption 
• The Proceeds of Crime Drug Disruption 
Index (POCDDI) was developed to 
measure the impact of proceeds of crime 
action on future criminal activity. 
• POCDDI estimates that for every dollar 
denied the criminal enterprise, $11.90 of 
future drug trafficking activity is disrupted.  
Methodology 
• Literature review scanning more than 150 journal articles, books, web reports 
• Interviews with 16 experts in the field (anonymity guaranteed) 
• Analysis of  AFP proceeds of crime investigations from 2003 to 2011 
• Development of a business model of drug trafficking 
Objective 
1. To measure the disruptive effect of 
proceeds of crime action on the drug 
trafficking; and 
2. Identify factors in proceeds of crime 
investigations that contribute to 
successful outcomes 
Target audience 
1. Senior police, policymakers, 
researchers 
2. Manager operations, senior 
investigators 
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Introductory remarks
This project is complex and these introductory remarks are aimed at directing the reader through some of that 
complexity. The Project on a Page schema summarises the main features of the study. It is intended to act as 
a guide and a ready reminder of the major features of the study.
The Executive Summary is primarily a hands-on document that summarises what we did, why we did it and 
what it means for the target audience. It also describes the limitations of our work and gives our thoughts on 
where future research might go. For those interested in the practical application of our results, the Executive 
Summary should be sufficient.
It is equally important that the report has a sound intellectual basis and can be placed within the mainstream 
literature on proceeds of crime. The body of our report fulfils this function. Some of the issues treated in the 
report are complex and we have attempted to explain these as clearly as we can for readers without technical 
backgrounds in statistics and other fields. The authors should be contacted directly for further explanation.
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Executive summary
Illicit drug trafficking is a source of funds for further trafficking and for supporting the lifestyles of criminals. Drug 
trafficking has been closely linked with organised crime and with social harms. This project had two main aims:
•	 To identify the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action on criminal activity. The project attempted to 
measure the disruptive effect by developing an economic model that estimated the multiplier impact of the 
reinvestment of the profits of drug trafficking. 
•	 The project also attempted to identify factors associated with successful proceeds of crime action. 
There are two main audiences for the findings of this study. Senior police, police intelligence, policymakers 
and researchers will be interested primarily in measuring the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action. 
Police responsible for managing proceeds of crime investigations and senior investigators will be interested in 
the practical applications of findings relating to success factors in financial investigations. 
The results of the project should improve agencies’ ability to target trafficking and increase the seizure of 
proceeds of crime. The proposed index of the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action—the Proceeds 
of Crime Drug Disruption Index (POCDDI)—will also allow agencies to provide both the Government and the 
community with a more accurate assessment of the value of their proceeds of crime initiatives.
Background to the study
We conducted an extensive literature review, as well as collecting information from expert sources in Australia. 
It is not intended to summarise the findings of the literature review here (see Chapter 2). It should be noted 
that in the wider literature proceeds of crime and money laundering are closely linked and issues relating to 
proceeds of crime are often dealt with under the broader heading of money laundering. As such, our review 
extended across both areas. 
The literature we surveyed was predominantly negative about the benefits of proceeds of crime/money 
laundering legislation. Various parties have raised concerns about the cost-effectiveness of anti-money 
laundering and proceeds of crime initiatives, their failure to target major crime figures and the infringement of 
civil liberties associated with implementation. We argue that very little attention has been paid to developing 
measures relevant to determining the success of these initiatives. Apart from the occasional comment, there 
has been little interest in the development of a coherent and explicit measurement framework for evaluation. 
Too often, studies have adopted measures that are readily available (eg arrests and forfeitures) rather than to 
develop measures that are truly appropriate for measuring the impact of proceeds of crime action upon the 
criminal enterprise and ultimately, through the disruption of crime, on the community.
The business-for-profit nature of the majority of drug trafficking suggests that a proper evaluation should take 
place within the context of an appropriate business model.
A business model of drug trafficking
To derive a business model of drug trafficking, we modified an existing business model of people trafficking 
operations developed by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Aronowitz et al. 2010). An 
outline of the modified business model for drug trafficking is presented in Table 1. People trafficking operations 
have many features in common with the global movement of illicit drugs, employing similar techniques and 
similar resources.
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Table 1. A basic supply model of illicit drug trafficking
Production Transportation Retail Consumer
Cultivation/production of raw drug/
precursor
Transport of illicit drug to 
consumer market
Wholesalers purchase from 
manufacturer and distribute 
to retailers
Established retailer–consumer 
relationships pose less risk to 
both retailer and consumer
Manufacture/refinement of illicit 
drug
Transport funded either by 
manufacturer or by wholesaler 
or both
Retailers provide drugs to 
regular customers and new 
customers
Consumer chooses product 
based on
Cost
Quality
Perceived risk
Transport across national 
borders require additional 
planning
Collection and reinvestment of 
revenues
Collection and reinvestment of 
revenues
Collection and reinvestment 
of revenues
Consumer experiences the 
social, psychological and 
physiological impact of drugs
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and perceived 
risk
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and 
perceived risk
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and 
perceived risk
The consideration of drug trafficking as a business provides an entirely different perspective to that provided 
by the literature review. The literature review tended to be pessimistic about the potential for proceeds of 
crime and money laundering legislation to disrupt crime. 
One of the major concerns was the apparent lack of evidence of any impact on key organised crime figures. 
From a business model perspective, this might be expected. If modern organised crime is comprised of 
shifting allegiances and cooperation between individuals and cells in one or more broadly based criminal 
groups, then such a result is to be anticipated. 
The hypothesis that proceeds of crime action should be directed at major crime figures is based on the 
unstated assumption that organised crime exhibits a concrete, hierarchical structure. Such an assumption is 
not consistent with modern notions of the structure of organised crime.
Adopting a business model of organised crime also gives us a clear indication of why proceeds of crime 
are important. All business models of organised crime assume that profit is the primary motive of such 
businesses, as it is with legitimate business enterprises. On that assumption, one would expect that 
successful proceeds of crime action would be disruptive to the business of crimes. Proceeds of crime action 
per se cannot be without value unless the business model of crime is wrong and that seems highly unlikely. 
If criticisms of proceeds of crime/money laundering efforts are to be sustained, they must be directed at the 
application of such regulations rather than the concept itself.
In conclusion, recognition of the ‘business’ nature of organised crime refutes many of the criticisms met with 
in the literature which has, in our opinion, focused too narrowly on the technicalities of proceeds of crime 
and money laundering regimes rather than recognising the broader theoretical framework within which these 
regimes exist. The adoption of an appropriate business model also assists us to identify the point in the supply 
chain where proceeds action may be most effective. With imported drugs, the most vulnerable point would 
appear to be the transportation of illicit drugs across national borders.
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Measuring the impact of proceeds of crime action
One of the principal aims of our research was to produce an index of the social impact of proceeds of crime 
action. The Proceeds of Crime Drug Disruption Index (POCDDI) estimates the revenue that would have been 
available for reinvestment in the criminal enterprise in the short to medium term had it not been for successful 
proceeds of crime action. POCDDI can also be described as a measure of the disruption to the criminal 
enterprise caused by proceeds of crime action. Summary information for the POCDDI is presented in Table 2. 
Basically, the index has three components. First, it requires knowledge of how much revenue is generated 
for each dollar of cost in drug trafficking (or profitability). Second, it requires an estimate of what proportion of 
illegal revenues are reinvested in further criminal activity, noting that a proportion of revenue will be spent on 
living expenses and other legitimate purposes. Finally, the model needs to specify the number of times profits 
are to be reinvested. Estimates on profitability were derived from Adkins (unpublished) and the reinvestment 
rate was estimated from original AFP data. How far into the future the POCDDI should predict is more 
problematic. Obviously, the assumptions behind the model will be less stable the further into the future we go. 
For our purposes, we decided to generate a short and medium term index based on one and two cycles of 
reinvestment.
POCDDI short term  = Profitability x Reinvestment Rate
POCDDI medium term = POCDDI short term
2
Where: 
•	 Profitability is the ratio of revenue to cost
•	 Reinvestment is the proportion of fund reinvested in further criminal activity
•	 Short term is the position after one period of criminal activity (around 3 months)
•	 Medium term is the position after two periods of criminal activity (around 6 months)
POCDDI was calculated for two models:
•	 The Overall Model refers to results averaged over the entire supply chain from producer to retailer.
•	 The Distributor Importer Producer Model excluded retail dealers (discussed below).
Table 2. Estimates of POCDDI short term and POCDDI medium term
POCDDI Model
Overall Model Distributor Importer Producer Model
Profitability 3.6 5.8
Reinvestment rate 60% 60%
POCDDI short term 2.2 3.5
POCDDI medium term 4.6 11.9
The POCDDI model calculates the downstream effect of proceeds of crime action given assumptions drawn 
from the literature, expert opinion and our own analysis. Under these conditions it is apparent that revenue will 
increase over time. The short term impact, that is, the impact after a single lag, is a reduction in criminal funds 
of $2.20 for the Overall Model and $3.50 for the Distributor Importer Producer Model for every $1 of criminal 
proceeds confiscated. In the medium term, these savings are $4.60 and $11.90 respectively. Given that the 
majority of proceeds of crime action is against individuals involved (a) in the production and/or importation 
of illicit drugs or their precursors, or (b) in the wholesale distribution of illicit drugs to retail dealers, it would 
appear reasonable to adopt the Distributor Importer Producer Model estimates for estimating the impact of 
6Targeting the Profits of Illicit Drug Trafficking through Proceeds of Crime Action
police action on criminal groups. A further observation to support the exclusion of retail dealers is the relatively 
high proportion of illicit drugs consumed by this group. The not-for-profit dealers contribute to this result.
In summary, as a reasonable estimate of the impact of proceeds of crime action in Australia, a multiplier of 
3.5 should be adopted to measure short-term disruption and 11.9 to measure medium-term disruption. As a 
general rule of thumb, the short term is a period up to three months and the medium term up to six months. For 
most practical applications, we would recommend the use of the medium term estimate of 11.90.
There are a number of benefits to the use of POCDDI estimates:
•	 First, the POCDDI highlights a key cost to the community associated with illicit drugs. Previous studies have 
identified the direct impact of drug use on, for example, property crime; none have attempted to quantify 
the reinvestment of the profits of drug trafficking into further trafficking. 
•	 Second, it provides law enforcement agencies with a more accurate estimate of the impact of their 
proceeds of crime activities on illicit drug trafficking. In turn, this should improve accountability to both 
Government and the community. 
•	 Third, estimates of benefits flowing from law enforcement activities assist in the allocation of internal 
resources and contribute to the case for further funding.
Such benefits are not always apparent. A case study is provided by a UK report. Sproat (2009b) found that 
proceeds of crime action generated a return of £143 million from an expenditure of £114 million on law 
enforcement. Converting Sproat’s reported figures to a ratio, it appears proceeds of crime action recovers a 
very modest £1.25 for every £1.00 invested by the Government. From a social impact perspective, we would 
argue that, in fact, every pound invested in such action resulted in £11.90 of disruption in the medium term. 
The impact of proceeds of crime action is put in focus by concentrating on disruption to crime rather than the 
actual amount recovered.
It should be noted that POCDDI is primarily an aggregate measure of the impact of proceeds of crime 
investigations on criminal activity. Obviously, the profit margin of individual crimes is influenced by a wide range 
of factors, such as the cost of raw materials, retail market pressures and the degree of difficulty in evading law 
enforcement. POCDDI is designed to report the benefits of proceeds of crime investigations over an extended 
period, preferably say one year.
Factors relating to successful proceeds of crime 
investigation
A second component of the research used proceeds of crime case data provided by the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) to investigate factors associated with successful proceeds of crime investigations. Because the 
data are from AFP investigations, it is important to note that the findings presented here are not generalisable 
to state jurisdictions, which operate with both a different mix of cases and a different legal framework. 
We attempted to identify factors related to successful proceeds of crime investigations using both descriptive 
statistics and modelling techniques. First, the value of proceeds in financial investigations is heavily 
concentrated in the largest cases. The top 10 percent of cases contained 80 percent of the total value of 
proceeds (see Figure 1). This observation is consistent with the Pareto Principle or 80/20 rule, which suggests 
that 80 percent of the effects come from 20 percent of the causes.
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Figure 1. Distribution of asset value for all assets and forfeited assets by case value
Conversely, as the value of a case increases, the proportion of assets forfeited tends to decline. In the 
‘bottom’ 50 percent of cases (by value), two in three assets are forfeited, while in the ‘top’ 50 percent, one in 
two assets are forfeited. This suggests that law enforcement should continue to pursue straightforward lower 
value cases due to their higher success rate, while focusing the bulk of their effort on large investigations 
because most of the value is in these cases. 
More complex statistical methods were employed to identify factors in the successful outcome of financial 
investigations (see Chapter 5 for details). It should be noted that the number of cases available for drug-
related proceeds of crime cases was insufficient to support the analysis. We decided to include proceeds 
of crime data from other crime types to increase the amount of data available for our statistical analysis. 
We tested our final model to evaluate whether the type of crime in any way influenced the factors related 
to success. Type of crime did not influence the model, which means that the types of factors that influence 
success in proceeds of crime action are the same for drug trafficking and other types of crime. A good 
financial investigation exhibits similar characteristics regardless of the predicate crime. 
The second major finding was that the duration of the financial investigation (as measured by the period from 
the restraint of an asset to its resolution) was statistically associated with the chance of success. The longer 
a financial investigation takes, the less likely it will be successful. For every year that passed, the odds of 
success were reduced by approximately one-third. 
The observed rate of decline could be useful in assisting financial investigation teams to assess the progress 
of individual cases. For example, where resources are scarce, this information would be helpful in weighing up 
whether to continue an ongoing case of some duration with a lower rate of success, as opposed to adopting 
a new case with a potentially higher chance of success. This finding may be of particular relevance as expert 
opinion confirmed that the main obstacle to pursuing proceeds of crime was lack of available resources in 
financial investigation teams.
Third, our model also suggested that the type of asset restrained was associated with the chance of a 
successful outcome. Liquid assets and commercial property were more likely to be forfeited than residential 
property and other assets. There is potential to improve the overall effectiveness of financial investigations if the 
reasons for the lower success rate with respect to residential property and other assets could be identified.
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Future directions
There are a number of opportunities to improve our understanding and application of proceeds of crime 
initiatives. The following observations are offered for further consideration.
•	 Expert opinion identified lack of available resources as the primary restraint on proceeds of crime activity.
•	 There is potential to consider the relative merits of differing operational approaches. Current individual 
practices range from full integration of financial investigation units into the investigation team to utilising 
financial investigation units as ‘separate’ advisors.
•	 It should be noted that the introduction of unexplained wealth provisions could have a significant impact on 
the current findings. It is too early to assess any potential impact and a new study should be commissioned 
at a suitable time.
•	 Similarly, the scope of and support for specific proceeds of crime legislation was noted by experts as a key 
determinant of overall success.
•	 There was concern expressed by a number of experts as to the proportion of proceeds of crime transferred 
overseas. Although outside the bounds of our study, the flight of proceeds to other countries is obviously a 
major concern that warrants further study.
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1 Introduction—Targeting the profits 
of illicit drug trafficking
Illicit drug trafficking is a source of funds for further trafficking and for supporting the lifestyles of criminals. 
Drug trafficking has been closely linked with organised crime and with social harms. This project will 
quantify the multiplier impact of the reinvestment of the profits of drug trafficking by identifying proceeds 
likely to be reinvested in crime and applying an appropriate economic model. The project will also attempt 
to identify factors associated with successful proceeds of crime action. The findings should improve 
agencies’ ability to target trafficking and increase the seizure of proceeds of crime. It will also allow 
agencies to provide both the Government and the community with a more accurate assessment of the 
value of their proceeds of crime initiatives.
1.1 Aims of the study
This study was aimed at estimating the multiplier effect of profits derived from drug trafficking. As with any 
business enterprise, a proportion of turnover will be reinvested in the business and lead to increased business 
activity. With respect to organised crime, a proportion of the profits of drug trafficking will be reinvested in further 
drug trafficking and may also be used to support the lifestyles of those involved. The research was specifically 
intended to:
1. Identify the reinvestment of the profits of drug trafficking into both legitimate and illegitimate activities.
2. Calculate the downstream profits and harms to the community produced as a result of the reinvestment of 
drug trafficking profits. 
3. Derive the multiplier effect of illicit drug trafficking on further criminal activity.
4. Identify factors associated with successful proceeds of crime investigations.
The results from the research should allow police agencies to better describe the true impact of their proceeds 
of crime activity on illicit drug trafficking and suggest ways in which these proceeds could be maximised. The 
research outcomes should enhance the evidence base for best practice in drug law enforcement by providing 
more accurate and operationally relevant estimates of the social impact associated with illicit drug trafficking. 
These results would also enhance the role of law enforcement in the research, development, piloting and 
evaluation of innovative illicit drug law enforcement practices by engaging both federal and state police in the 
project through the establishment of a project steering committee. Finally, the results of the study should lead 
to better informed decision making by law enforcement agencies in terms of the direction and targeting of 
drug law enforcement and increased confiscation of proceeds of crime.
1.2 Potential benefits
There are a number of benefits to this study.
•	 First, it highlights a key cost to the community associated with illicit drugs. Previous studies have identified 
the direct impact of drug use on, for example, property crime; none have looked at the reinvestment of the 
profits of drug trafficking into further criminal activity. 
•	 Second, it provides police with a more accurate estimate of the impact of their drug law enforcement 
activities, especially with reference to money laundering and proceeds of crime activity. In turn, this should 
improve accountability to both Government and the community. 
10
Targeting the Profits of Illicit Drug Trafficking through Proceeds of Crime Action
•	 Third, it should allow police to target those drug trafficking activities that are more likely to result in further 
criminal activity. 
•	 Finally, it may provide a means for agencies to increase their seizures of criminal assets and proceeds of crime.
1.3 Background
According to Sherman (2006), proceeds of crime action in Australia dates from the introduction of relevant 
legislation at federal, state and territory level during the 1980s and followed a series of recommendations from 
Royal Commissions in the previous decades. Sherman (2006) noted the importance of proceeds of crime 
legislation in combating organised crime and drug trafficking, although he expressed some doubts over the 
effectiveness of criminal law measures. The issue of effectiveness is more complex than it first appears. The 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2008) noted the difficulties in reporting the amount of proceeds of crime 
recovered by the Commonwealth. 
While it is important to report on activity, in this case proceeds forfeited, it is equally important to report on the 
social impact of public sector efforts (Office of Best Practice Regulation 2009). For example, the Australian 
Taxation Office has been criticised in the media for its failure to recoup its outlay from its investigations of 
possible tax evasion by high wealth and often high profile individuals (Project Wickenby). However, the 
Australian Taxation Office (p.88 2008) reported that significant additional voluntary contributions had been 
made by high wealth individuals since the launch of Wickenby. There was an estimated increase of 70% in 
net tax payable by those targeted by Wickenby. In addition, intelligence suggested that two schemes worth in 
excess of $100 million had been abandoned. In other words, while the investigation of Wickenby cases was 
not cost-effective in terms of actual amounts recovered, it was highly effective in terms of revenue generated 
by increased voluntary compliance. It appears that the important social impact of Wickenby has been offset 
by an over-emphasis on measuring the activity of Wickenby. 
There are important parallels with the reporting of proceeds of crime in the literature where the level of activity 
is reported in the absence of comment on the social impact of that activity. As recently as October 2009, the 
Scottish Government (2009) noted that there is no harm reduction measure related to proceeds of crime. To 
the authors’ knowledge, the current project is the first attempt to measure the social impact of proceeds of 
crime action in Australia or elsewhere.
It is perhaps just as important to realise what was not attempted in this study. The study does not attempt 
to describe, evaluate or compare proceeds of crime activities across Australian jurisdictions and agencies. 
Expert opinion from various state and federal agencies was collected on the assumption of anonymity to 
ensure an open and frank discussion.
1.4 Method
There were four major components to the study:
•	 An exhaustive review of the literature with separate searches being undertaken in relation to proceeds of 
crimes, business models of organised crime and the illicit drug market in Australia. The information gained 
from this review informed subsequent stages of the study.
•	 A survey of expert knowledge from major law enforcement agencies through interview or workshop. (Note: 
to ensure an open discussion, anonymity was guaranteed.)
•	 The development of a business model of illicit drug trafficking in Australia and the development of a 
measure of the impact of proceeds of crime action.
•	 Multivariate analysis of proceeds of crime data from Australian agencies to identify factors relating to 
successful proceeds of crime action.
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1.5 Structure of the report
This introduction explains the background to our project. It is followed by a review of proceeds of crime and 
anti-money laundering initiatives both here and globally and a review of evaluations of these initiatives (Chapter 
2). A business model of illicit drug trafficking is introduced (Chapter 3) to underpin the development of a social 
impact measure of proceeds of crime activity (Chapter 4). To this point, the project has primarily relied on 
literature reviews, the results of previous research and expert opinion. Chapter 5 includes a multivariate analysis 
of Australian Federal Police data to identify factors associated with success in proceeds of crime cases using 
data related to (a) illicit drug cases only, and (b) all crime types. This analysis is supplemented by the results of an 
expert opinion survey. The conclusion (Chapter 6) contains recommendations related to our findings and issues 
for future consideration and research. Attachment A provides a short review of the illicit drug market in Australia 
which provides a contextual background for readers who may not be familiar with it.
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2 Literature review of proceeds  
of crime
This literature review was undertaken in order to provide a suitable backdrop for our research project and, 
more importantly, to derive historical information that might assist in identifying the impact of proceeds of 
crime action on the criminal enterprise. 
It was clear from the outset that the phrase ‘proceeds of crime’ although a very exact description of the 
subject matter may have restricted value in a literature review. Much of the literature of interest to our study 
is to be found under the headings of money laundering and organised crime. It should be noted that while 
all money laundering involves proceeds of crime not all criminal proceeds are laundered. This distinction 
highlights one of the main themes in our project: some proceeds of crime are directly invested in further crime 
whereas others are put to legitimate uses.
Organised crime is an even wider net but an appropriate one if we hope to apply a business model to 
proceeds of crime. All this must be set within the specific context of illicit drug importation and trafficking. 
Again, it was apparent that if the literature pertaining to ‘proceeds of crime’ was somewhat thin, then the 
subset of articles relating to illicit drugs was exceedingly sparse. Thus, although the review was undertaken 
with an emphasis on illicit drugs, the decision was made to examine other crime types and to assess the 
extent to which findings in other areas could be applied to the business of supplying illicit drugs. 
Finally, it should be noted that the precise meaning of phrases such as ‘proceeds of crime’ and ‘money 
laundering’ will vary across jurisdictions in Australia depending on the detail of their respective legislation. 
Such differences will be exacerbated when considering the result internationally. Nevertheless, it is reasonable 
to assume that there is sufficient commonality of meaning to allow for broad observations that can be applied 
across nations and across jurisdictions in Australia.
The literature review incorporated the following steps:
•	 A review of the formal literature using key words such as ‘proceeds of crime’, ‘money laundering’, 
‘organised crime’ and ‘illicit drugs’. The references provided by these studies were reviewed for additional 
material.
•	 Money laundering has its own subject matter journal The Journal of Money Laundering Control. Every article 
published since 1 January 2000 was considered.
•	 A review of major websites for material provided by Government and other bodies was also undertaken 
using either the key words indicated above or by examining websites of known relevance.
•	 Face-to-face discussions were held with the Australian Crime Commission, the Queensland Crime and 
Misconduct Commission, Queensland Police and the Australian Federal Police to identify any other potential 
sources of information. 
The literature review will attempt to address a number of issues. First, the review will provide a broad 
description of legislation relating to proceeds of crime and money laundering locally and internationally. 
Second, the review will consider the social impact of the reinvestment of proceeds of crime as far as possible 
in relation to illicit drugs but also mentioning other types of criminality. Third, the review will attempt to evaluate 
the success, including barriers to success, of the relevant legislation. Finally, the review will identify key issues 
from the literature that will inform our study and provide a framework for the results presented.
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2.1 The situation here and abroad
In Australia, proceeds of crime legislation were developed following a request in 1983 from the Australian 
Police Ministers Council to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. There was a strong link between 
proceeds and crime legislation and drug law enforcement from the beginning. The proposal to develop 
uniform legislation across Australia was endorsed by the Special Ministers Conference on Drugs in 1985. 
Eventually, all jurisdictions developed their own legislation between 1985 and 1993. Since that time, most 
jurisdictions have introduced amendments to allow civil forfeiture. Current legislation is listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Current Proceeds of Crime Legislation
Jurisdiction Title Year
Commonwealth Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 2002
Australian Capital Territory Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003
New South Wales Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Amendment Act 2005
Northern Territory Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002
Queensland Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002
South Australia Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 2005
Tasmania Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1993 1993
Victoria Confiscation Act 1997
Western Australia Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000
As noted above, a significant impetus for proceeds of crime legislation in Australia originally came from the 
drug law enforcement sector. This interest in the link between drugs and proceeds of crimes can be traced 
to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 
(United Nations, 1988) where parties to the treaty agreed that they were ‘determined to deprive persons 
engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities’ (p.1). The introduction of proceeds of 
crime legislation in Australia in effect made good Australia’s international commitment as a party to the 
1987 convention. The Australian Institute of Criminology (2008) in a brief overview of federal confiscation of 
proceeds of crime in Australia noted that the rationale for such legislation was twofold:
First, the removal of funds generated by criminal activities is intended to deprive criminals of the benefits 
of their financially motivated criminality, thus reducing the motivation for offending. Confiscation also 
entails punishment for wrongdoing, which may deter further offending by both the criminal and others in 
the community. Second, removing access to assets generated from criminal activities reduces the capital 
available to perpetrators of future criminal ventures (p.1).
Similar legislation relating to both proceeds of crime and/or money laundering was enacted in a large number 
of countries globally. References were found in the formal literature to the enactment of legislation in 29 
countries including Argentina (Ruiz 2002), Australia (Johnson 2000), Belgium (Verhage 2009), Canada (Murphy 
2003), Georgia (Gotz & Jonsson 2009), Germany (Blocker 2002), China (Ping 2007), Hong Kong (Sham 
2006), Hungary (Roule 2002), Iran (Rahmdel 2002), Ireland (Ashe & Reid 2001), Israel (Harpaz 2001), Lebanon 
(Fheili 2001), Malaysia (Shanmugam et al 2003), Mexico (Varga  & Backhouse 2003), Myanmar (Joyce 2002), 
The Netherlands, (Nelen 2004), Nigeria (Okogbule 2007), Poland (Plywaczewski 2000), Russia (Subbotina 
2008), South Africa (de Koker 2002a,b), Spain (Cabana 2007), Switzerland (Capus 2003), Taiwan (Ching 
2004), Turkey (Okuyucu 2008), Ukraine (Roule & Salak 2003), United Kingdom (Harvey 2005), USA (Baldwin 
2002) and Zambia (Okogbuke 2007).
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It is likely that other reports appear in non-English journals and in other less formal sources. There is little 
doubt that the adoption of legislation to combat money laundering and to permit the confiscation of proceeds 
of crime is widespread.  Furthermore, there is evidence for the uptake of relevant legislation in countries which 
initially failed to do so. The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body that assists nation states 
to implement measures designed to counter the use of the financial system by criminals.  It established a 
framework in 1990 which was subsequently revised in 1996 and 2003. In 2000-2001, the Task Force listed 
23 countries which failed to comply substantively with its framework (Shahin 2005).  However, four countries 
were delisted in 2001, eight in 2002, two in 2003 and three in 2004 leaving six countries remaining on the list 
in 2005 (Shahin 2005). In summary, there has been considerable legislative action in Australia and globally to 
address the issue of proceeds of crime and money laundering. 
Despite these efforts, the problem is far from disappearing. In October 2011, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime released a report on the size of illicit financial flows arising from drug trafficking and other 
transnational crime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011). The report suggested that, in 2009, 
proceeds of crime accounted for 3.6% of global GDP or approximately US$2.1 trillion. Money laundering 
through the world’s financial systems accounted for 2.7% of global GDP or US$1.6 trillion. When the analysis 
was restricted to transnational crime including drug trafficking, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
reported that proceeds of crime were equivalent to 1.5% of global GDP or US$870 billion in 2009. The report 
also noted that illicit drugs were the main contributor to the income of organised crime accounting for 20% of 
all criminal proceeds and about half the income derived from transnational crime. The report concluded that 
globally the interception rate for proceeds of crime is low, probably less than one percent.
2.2 Social impact of proceeds of crime
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report (2011) identified social impact of criminal proceeds 
relating firstly to reinvestment in crime and secondly to investments in the legitimate economy.
•	 Analysis of the socio-economic impact suggests that the most severe consequence of criminal funds is the 
further perpetuation and promotion of criminal activities. In the drug area, research indicates that the socio-
economic costs related to drug abuse are twice as high as the income generated by organised crime; in 
some countries (USA, UK) one can even find a 3:1 ratio.
•	 Criminal funds, even if invested in the legal economy, may create a number of problems, from distortions of 
the resource allocation, to ‘crowding out’ licit sectors and undermining the reputation of local institutions, 
which, in turn, can hamper investment and economic growth. The situation is less clear-cut for financial 
centres receiving illicit funds, but the long-term consequences may be negative if they do not actively fight 
money-laundering. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, p.8)
This distinction between reinvestment and legitimate use reflects one of the major concerns of this report, 
namely the proportion of income reinvested in crime. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (2011, p. 99), drug trafficking has a higher level of reinvestment than other forms of crime. Thus, it 
would appear that proceeds of crime action against drug traffickers would result in a greater reduction in 
subsequent criminal activity than comparable action against other crime types. The actual impact of proceeds 
of crime action will be the subject of review later in this chapter. Nevertheless, assuming that proceeds of 
crime action is effective in preventing criminal activity then it is especially effective against drug trafficking.
There have been a number of reports into the social impact of illicit drugs in Australia. Collins and Lapsley 
(2008) estimated in 2004-05 that illicit drugs carried a social cost to the Australian community of $8.2 billion. 
Moore (2007) introduced a number of enhancements to the Collins and Lapsley methodology and estimated 
the total cost of selected illicit drugs in 2004 to be near $12 billion. Results are similar worldwide. The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011, p.101) estimated that illicit drugs caused harms in Australia 
amounting to 1.0 percent of GDP compared with the weighted average for a group of countries with available 
data of 1.2 percent.
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The use of socio-economic measures expressed in dollars or proportion of GDP disguises the human impact 
of the problem. Perhaps the most widely known example of a nation negatively impacted by the trade in 
illicit drugs is Mexico. Simser (2011, p.266) reported the extent of impact of drug cartels on life in Mexico. In 
Cuidad Juarez, a city of 1.3 million people, seven people a day are murdered by drug gangs. Between 2006 
and 2010 28,000 people died from drug-related violence in Mexico as a whole. The extent of corruption and 
social disruption suggests that Mexico is ‘a weak and potentially failing state’ and a potential national security 
threat to the USA (Simser 2011, p.267). While recognising the extent of the problem in Mexico, it is perhaps 
prudent to note that the links between social disorder and the drug trade are not as strong in other countries. 
De Andrade Filho (2008) provided an overview of the relationship between illicit drugs, organised crime and 
corruption in Brazil. In Brazil, the more extreme elements of the Mexican experience are lacking.
It is possible to distinguish between the harm associated with the use of illicit drugs and the broader impacts 
of criminal proceeds on society. The use of criminal proceeds to fund legitimate enterprises, even philanthropic 
projects, has a long history. Van Duyne and Soudijn (2009) noted the contribution of criminal proceeds to 
the construction of the Peace Palace in the Netherlands and to the establishment of Stanford University in 
the USA. The conversion of criminal proceeds into legitimate assets (i.e. money laundering) is a necessary 
step if criminals are to enjoy, in relative safety, the products of their criminal activities. It would appear that the 
use of proceeds to stimulate the legitimate economy may benefit the community as a whole. Certainly, there 
are situations where this is the case but conversely others where the entry of criminal funds into a legitimate 
market distort that market to the detriment of society as a whole.
McDowell and Novis (2001) described the potential negative impacts of criminal proceeds entering the 
legitimate economy including:
•	 Undermining the private sector. Where criminal proceeds are used, in effect, to subsidise a legitimate 
business it provides a competitive advantage over companies playing within the rules.
•	 Undermining the integrity of financial markets. The swift movement of large sums of money through the 
financial system can create liquidity problems for banks and other financial institutions and has been 
associated with a number of bank failures including the first Internet bank, the European Union Bank.
•	 Loss of economic control. The involvement of organised crime in foreign currency manipulation can threaten 
government control of modest to small economies and create instability in foreign exchange markets.
•	 Reputation risk. The perception that certain countries are more likely to be involved in the acceptance or 
transfer of criminal proceeds. Loss of market and/or investor confidence can reduce the economic viability 
of such countries.
Even in well developed economies, the impact of criminal proceeds entering the legitimate economy can be 
destabilising. The potential for such impacts has been reported with respect to real estate (Nelen 2008; Ritzen 
2011; Schneider 2004a), the stock market (Lai 2011; Sharma 2001), international trade (Liao & Acharya 2011), 
public contracts (Canapple et al 2009), insurance (Thanasegaran & Shanmugam 2008), and gambling (Hugel 
& Kelly 2002). The contribution of illicit funds to corruption was noted earlier with respect to Mexico and Brazil, 
however, the corrupting influence of proceeds of crime is not limited to these nations alone. The relationship 
between corruption and proceeds has been discussed in detail by Sharman and Chaikin (2009) and Van der 
Does de Willebois et al (2011: Foreword). The latter summarised the impact of corruption as follows:
Corruption is estimated to be at least a $40 billion dollar a year business. Every day, funds destined 
for schools, healthcare, and infrastructure in the world’s most fragile economies are siphoned off and 
stashed away in the world’s financial centers and tax havens. Corruption, like a disease, is eating away 
at the foundation of people’s faith in government. It undermines the stability and security of nations. So it 
is a development challenge in more ways than one: it directly affects development assistance, but it also 
undermines the preconditions for growth and equity. 
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An alternative perspective on criminal proceeds and the legitimate economy has been proposed by Beare 
(2007), who argued that the distinction is not as clear as the literature assumes. In fact, society is to some 
extent tolerant of criminality within corporations and it is the ‘criminal behaviour’ of legitimate businesses, 
accountants and officials that may be potentially more harmful to society than the infiltrations of the legitimate 
economy by criminal proceeds. An interesting but largely unsubstantiated claim reported in The Observer 
suggested that drug money kept many banks afloat at the height of the global financial crisis (Syal 2009).
In summary, the consensus opinion to date is that the application of criminal proceeds to fund further crime or 
as an investment in legitimate business enterprises has profound social impact. The reinvestment of proceeds 
into criminal activity, as noted earlier, is the major concern and even the investment of proceeds in legitimate 
business enterprises has a negative impact on the market. This latter impact is generally in terms of a slight to 
moderate disruption to various markets, e.g. real estate, foreign currency, insurance, but in its more extreme 
forms may threaten the viability of the state itself.
2.3 Evaluating the success of anti-money laundering and 
proceeds of crime legislation
The claim that stopping the money will stop the crime has been repeated many times over many years by 
government and law enforcement officials alike. While there is a strong commonsense appeal to this notion, 
empirical evidence to substantiate such a claim is more difficult to establish. In the first place, the extent and 
content of legislation to attain this goal differs both between and within nations making both across border 
and within border comparisons that much more difficult. As noted earlier, the distinction between ‘anti-money 
laundering’ and ‘proceeds of crime’ is not easy to maintain given that the former is a subset of the other. 
Therefore, the following review will encompass evaluations conducted under the title of ‘proceeds of crime’ 
and ‘money laundering’. The evaluations will be grouped under domestic and international. A final caveat: 
proceeds of crime and anti-money laundering legislation has changed considerably over past decades, and 
law enforcement strategies, techniques and technology have also changed. Some of the evaluations quoted 
are over ten years old and might raise issues that were subsequently addressed.
In Australia, conviction-based proceeds of crime legislation has been in place since the 1980s. The 
shortcomings of conviction-based legislation were widely recognised (Australian Law Reform Commission, 
1998) and civil forfeiture legislation was introduced by the Commonwealth, States and Territories during the 
1990s and early 2000s. Sherman (2006) conducted an independent review of Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(Cth) as required by Section 327 of that Act. He concluded that the Act had achieved its aim and that it was 
more effective than its predecessor although noting the difficulty with making such comparisons with the data 
available at the time. It should be noted that the number of matters and total amount forfeited for drug-related 
investigations fell between the comparison years of 2001-02 and 2005-06 (Sherman 2006, p.20). Sherman 
made a wide range of recommendations which emphasises the evolving nature of proceeds of crime 
legislation and enforcement.
The major recommendations of the review are as follows:
a) the Act should contain a clear mandate for agencies to pass on information acquired under the Act 
to other agencies;
b) the ACS, the ATO and ASIC be given powers to issue s.213 notices to financial institutions, and that 
the ATO be given the same access to coercive powers under the Act as the other agencies;
c) the CAA be made a normal income and expenditure account with greater flexibility for payments, this 
is to be accompanied by greater accountability to the Parliament on the operations of the account;
d) the processing of legal aid claims should be made more flexible and efficient;
e) the limitation period for civil confiscation be extended from six to twelve years;
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f) a court be able to make an examination order before a restraining order is made and that applications 
for such orders can be made ex parte;
g) the penalties for offences related to failure to attend examinations and refusal to answer questions 
be increased; 
h) a new offence of providing false or misleading information in connection with an examination be created;
i) magistrates be given power to make PPOs, and make conviction-based forfeiture orders, when 
indictable offences are dealt with summarily;
j) the definitions of ‘financial institution’ and ‘serious offence’ be expanded.
(Sherman 2006, Executive Summary)
The recommendations included one reference to ‘greater accountability to the Parliament’ (c.) but otherwise did 
not address the issue of measuring the impact of proceeds of crime action. More recently, proceeds of crime 
legislation has been supplemented by unexplained wealth provisions – Northern Territory in 2003, Queensland, 
Western Australia and South Australia in 2009, the Commonwealth and New South Wales in 2010. 
The pros and cons of such legislation have been summarised by the Australian Institute of Criminology 
(Bartels 2010):
Pros:
•	 To deter potential criminal activity by increasing the cost of crime.
•	 To reduce the funds available for reinvestment in crime.
•	 To seek moral redress by removing wealth gained through criminal activities.
Cons:
•	 The presumption of innocence is undermined by reversing the onus of proof.
•	 The right to silence is undermined by specific provisions of the act(s).
•	 The potential for arbitrary exercise of power exists.
It should be noted that there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the pros; and the cons are based 
largely on concerns surrounding civil liberties. This observation should not be taken to undermine arguments 
either for or against but rather as an indication of the nature of the debate in Australia. These points also 
neatly summarise the main arguments for and against proceeds of crime legislation and anti-money 
laundering provisions in the wider literature.
Perhaps the most fertile ground for evaluation of anti-money laundering and proceeds of crime legislation 
is the UK, and the findings are almost uniformly bleak. A number of authors report no discernible effect on 
crime (Bell 2000a; Harvey 2005; Haynes 2008; Sproat 2007a) and especially organised crime (Sproat 2007a 
2009a). The cost of running a money laundering/proceeds of crime regime was generally considered to 
be greater than the benefits (Bosworth-Davies 2008; Harvey 2005; Rider 2008). Only Kennedy (2007) was 
positive about proceeds of crime legislation by reference to the increasing amount of forfeitures. Murray (2010) 
attributed the relative lack of success of proceeds of crime action to the increasingly complex arrangements 
put in place by organised crime. Bosworth-Davies (2008) was inclined to see anti-money laundering and 
proceeds of crime legislation as a political smokescreen to divert attention from the extent of white collar 
crime in the UK financial sector. Similarly, Gelemerova (2011) concluded that ‘the fight against money 
laundering has become a variable of political choices and subject to double standards rather than a targeted 
effort to curb crime for profit’ (p. 254).The Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Corporation of London 
commissioned a survey of interested parties to assess perceptions of the costs and benefits of anti-money 
laundering regulations (Yeandle et al 2005). Two thirds of respondents believed the burden of these regulations 
was not justified by the level of risk of money laundering activity. Compliance with the regulations was due to 
sanctions imposed for non-compliance rather than the fact that this was good business practice or reduced 
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the incidence of crime. Corporate experience of the high cost of compliance was associated with a perception 
of low effectiveness in relation to fighting crime.
Formal cost-benefit analyses of anti-money laundering and proceeds of crime activity were undertaken by 
Sproat (2007b 2009b). In the earlier study, Sproat included the cost to Government as well as compliance 
costs to industry. Benefits were measured mainly in terms of forfeiture. The results suggested relevant 
regulation costs far more to implement than it recovered, with every £1 of criminal assets recovered costing 
£3.73. In the later analysis, Sproat was concerned with Government costs only. In this case, benefits of £143 
million were generated from an expenditure of £114 million. It should be noted that proceeds of crime activity 
does not carry a major private sector burden so that the results reported by Sproat (2009b) are probably a 
better indication of the benefits and costs associated with that specific activity. Converting Sproat’s reported 
figures to a ratio, it appears that proceeds of crime action recovers £1.25 for every £1.00 expended. Taking 
the results of the UK studies as a whole, it would appear that proceeds of crime action does not have a major 
impact on drug trafficking or crime in general and returns at best slightly more than it costs to implement and 
even this modest claim is tentative at best.
A number of evaluations in other countries reached similar conclusions. Schneider (2004b) concluded that 
money laundering linked to illegal drug trafficking had little impact on the Canadian economy and that the 
cost of enforcement probably outweighed the potential benefits. Nelen (2004) concluded that proceeds of 
crime action was used primarily against minor criminals and not against organised crime. Furthermore, there 
was evidence that a prison sentence was a greater deterrent than proceeds of crime action. Potential losses 
to the criminal could be integrated into the cost of doing business. Similarly, money laundering legislation 
was ineffective against organised crime in Russia (Orlova 2008). In Sweden, Magnusson (2007) concluded 
that the cost of implementing anti-money laundering legislation could not be justified by the results to date. 
Geiger and Wuensch (2007) reached the same conclusion with respect to Switzerland. An expert group 
in Indonesia concluded that the costs of that country’s money laundering regime probably outweighed the 
benefits (Rusmin & Brown 2008). Interestingly, it has been suggested that ‘following the money’ may be an 
effective way to stop illegal logging in Indonesia (Walters 2010). This study highlights the need to look outside 
of the historical concern with amount forfeited to wider measures of the impact of anti-money laundering and 
proceeds of crime action. The preservation of the rainforest in Indonesia may have ramifications massively 
greater than the financial profit associated with illegal logging.
Finally, a small number of studies have addressed the issues of money laundering and proceeds of crime from 
an international perspective. It will be recalled that criminal proceeds attributable to transnational crime were 
equivalent to 1.5% of global GDP or US$870 billion in 2009 with illicit drugs contributing 50 percent of that 
amount (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011). In terms of proceeds and illicit drugs it is important 
to look across as well as within nations.
Initiatives sponsored by the Financial Action Task Force have played an important role in international anti-
money laundering and proceeds of crime initiatives. Johnson & Lim (2002) noted the pivotal role played by 
banks in international money laundering and used multiple regression techniques to measure the strength 
of the banking-money laundering connection. They compared pre and post data for nine countries joining 
the Financial Action Task Force and for nine countries that did not. They concluded that while the situation 
had improved in the majority of countries involved in the Financial Action Task Force, the situation had 
deteriorated in eight of the nine countries that did not join. Other reports with an international perspective 
include Mohamed (2002) who argued for European Union legislation as an appropriate model for other nations 
to adopt, Borgers & Moors (2007) who noted the need for increased international cooperation on proceeds 
of crime initiatives, and Cuellar (2003) and Bosworth-Davies (2006) who both argued against the value of the 
global anti-money laundering approach. From a largely methodological perspective, Preller (2008) noted the 
difficulties, in the absence of a standardised measurement framework, of making comparisons across nations 
of relative efficiency and effectiveness.
There is a limited literature on the factors affecting successful implementation and evaluation. These can 
be broadly divided into two groups (i) definitional issues and the need for more data or better data analysis 
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techniques (Arnone & Borline 2010; Beare 2002; Ferwerda et al 2011; Gao & Ye 2007; Harvey 2009; Tupman 
2009), and (ii) legal and administrative issues (Bell 2000b 2001 2002; Brindle 2001; Douglas 2007; Rosdol 
2007; Roule & Kinsell 2002, Sherman 2006) noting that there is an extensive literature on specific legislation in 
individual jurisdictions not included here.
In the previous section, we observed that there is general agreement in the literature of the extent and deleterious 
nature of the impact of criminal proceeds. This degree of agreement is almost matched by the agreement in 
this section that anti-money laundering and proceeds of crime initiatives have to date been largely ineffective.
2.4 Implications for our study
The literature we have analysed is both informative and to a degree surprising. The overwhelming conclusion 
noted above is ‘yes we have a problem and no we don’t have a solution’ or at least we do not have a cost-
effective solution. The problem is probably not as great if we limit ourselves to proceeds of crime rather than 
including money laundering offences. The high cost to industry of enforcing anti-money laundering legislation 
is a prime contributor for the poor cost-effectiveness results reported in the literature. These costs do not 
apply directly to proceeds of crime although a proportion of proceeds of crime actions may result from 
surveillance systems operated by financial institutions. In such cases, it is reasonable to take into account the 
costs borne by financial institutions.
We would argue that, more importantly, very little attention has been paid to developing measures relevant 
to the questions we are asking. Apart from the occasional comment, there has been little interest in the 
development of a coherent and explicit measurement framework for evaluation. Too often, studies have 
adopted measures that are readily available (e.g. arrests and forfeitures) rather than to develop measures that 
are truly appropriate to measuring the impact of proceeds of crime action upon the criminal enterprise and 
ultimately, through the disruption of crime, on the community.
There are three major questions with respect to anti-money laundering and proceeds of crime initiatives:
•	 Has it reduced the level of crime, e.g. drug trafficking or terrorism?
•	 What has been the impact on organised crime?
•	 Have these initiatives been cost-effective?
We argue that the use of simple arrest or forfeiture statistics is unlikely to resolve any of these matters. For 
example, it appears to be true across many jurisdictions that arrests and forfeiture actions are generally not 
carried out against senior organised crime figures. This should not be considered a failure to have an impact 
on organised crime. If the ‘follow the money’ hypothesis has any credence in relation to organised crime, 
it must be in terms of the criminal organisation not any individual within it. The $1 million in possession of 
a low level member may be destined for a drug deal but the member is merely the agent not the owner of 
these funds. Confiscating $1 million probably has little impact on the agent but it does have an impact on 
the criminal organisation. There may be other good grounds for considering the arrest of senior crime figures 
desirable but this should not be confused with the impact of cutting off funds. We argue then that it is the 
funds denied or the disruption to the criminal enterprise that is the crucial element to measuring success.
As we have proposed elsewhere, the actual amount of forfeiture is not indicative of the impact of proceeds of 
crime action (or anti-money laundering activities). The true measure of proceeds of crime initiatives is in future 
criminal activity prevented or disrupted. It is the measure of crime prevented that is critical to answering the 
three questions posed above.
We acknowledge that, in our original proposal, we suggested that criminal funds invested in crime 
contributed to social harm whereas such funds invested in the legitimate economy did not. From the 
evidence provided in the literature review, it appears that the latter assertion may not be true. There 
appear to be harms associated with the investment of criminal funds in the legitimate economy. It is 
noted, however, that the majority of harm appears to result from investment in further criminal activity 
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while estimates of harm resulting from legitimate investment vary considerably. In some jurisdictions, the 
undermining of the legitimate economy appears negligible, e.g. Canada, whereas in a number of Latin 
American countries the impact is considerable, e.g. Mexico.
On balance, we have decided to remain within our original proposal to develop a measure of the value of 
crime prevented by proceeds of crime action. It follows that if we have omitted estimates of harm from 
legitimate investments of criminal funds, then our overall measure will tend to be conservative with respect 
to total harms avoided.
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3 A business model of organised crime
The development of a model of organised crime will underpin our work on measuring the impact of proceeds 
of crime activity. D’Andria (2011) noted that the criminal organisations world-wide are characterised by a 
tendency toward internationalisation and the adoption of management practices typical of the legitimate 
corporate sector. He concluded that the ability to limit organised crime’s investment choices is a significant 
factor in deterring further criminal activity. 
It might reasonably be expected, and certainly the assumption is often implicit, that a penalty applied to 
someone near the apex of the organised crime pyramid is more likely to be effective than a penalty applied to 
someone at the base level of the structure. Whether this is so is open to question. It is certainly safer to assume 
that the impact of proceeds of crime activity will be related to the specific structure of the criminal organisation.
It is not intended in this chapter to review the extensive literature on organised crime in any detail; rather 
the chapter will focus on organised crime structures as they apply to the trade in illicit drugs in Australia. 
These observations will then be summarised into a specific business model. The chapter will conclude with a 
summary of the implications of this review for our study.
There are, however, a few general points to consider before undertaking the specific review. The first perhaps 
self-evident point to make is that there is no single model of organised crime that would apply uniformly 
to all known instances of organised crime. Certainly, in the popular media, organised crime tends to be 
presented as strongly hierarchical with a dominant leader, captains, lieutenants and foot soldiers. It involves 
a specific organisational culture with well-defined mutual obligations and support. It has well-defined means 
of communication and often involves an element of ritual, e.g. initiation and advancement rites. Another 
important feature of this model is that it portrays the structure and culture of the crime group as enduring over 
time. The hierarchical model clearly places organised crime in the same class of organisations as the military, 
police, public sector bureaucracy and some religions.
The alternative view is that organised crime is generally not highly structured and not strongly hierarchical. 
According to such an entrepreneurial model, organised crime stems from groups with some shared and 
legitimate interest (e.g. bikie clubs or specific immigrant groups) that venture into illicit activities. In this 
scenario, the wider group provides the opportunity and the support for individual entrepreneurs to conduct 
criminal activities. The group also provides a relatively secure base from which to operate. It should be noted 
that such groups tend to have a specific group culture, a feature also of the hierarchical model.
In fact, the differences between these two views relates predominantly to the degree of top-down intentionality 
in planning criminal activities. It is certainly not unreasonable to propose that some groups might exhibit 
behaviours typical of both models. On occasions, the group may engage in a concerted, planned and 
structured activity while at other times individuals or small subsets of individuals may engage in more sporadic 
criminal activity.
The degree of organisation of a criminal activity will also be influenced by the nature of that activity. For 
example, in Australia it is a relatively simple matter for an individual of modest means to cultivate and harvest 
a cannabis crop in their own backyard or within their own home. It is probably safe to assume that such an 
individual will have a ready circle of fellow users to purchase the product. On occasions, such individuals 
might operate on a not-for-profit basis.
By way of contrast, the degree of organisation required to import a large quantity of heroin or cocaine into 
Australia is formidable. A successful operation requires both partners and contacts in the source country as 
well as Australia. The crossing of at least two borders with illicit substances represents a substantial barrier 
and has spawned a wide diversity of innovative means of importation from filling cargo containers to filling 
body cavities.
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The exact nature of organised crime may not have a major influence on the direction of our study; however, 
an understanding of the business model(s) under which drug traffickers operate will assist in developing a 
measure of the impact of proceeds of crime action on illicit drug enterprises.
3.1 Organised crime in Australia
The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) (2011a 2011c) has provided recent and detailed reviews of the 
operation of organised crime in Australia. The ACC (2011a) has estimated the annual cost of organised crime to 
the Australian economy as between $10 and $15 billion. Approximately half of this amount related to illicit drugs. 
The ACC (p.6 2011a) has identified the major harms related to organised crime as:
•	 the loss of legitimate business and taxation revenue 
•	 expenditure on law enforcement efforts 
•	 expenditure on managing the social harms that compromise the health, safety and wellbeing of individuals 
and communities 
•	 threats to the integrity of political and public institutional systems through infiltration of these systems 
•	 loss of confidence in businesses and organisations 
•	 emotional, physical and psychological costs to victims of organised crime, their families and communities 
•	 community fear.
The economic size of the problem and the lists of harms summarised by the ACC are consistent with the 
findings reported in Chapter 2 Literature review of Proceeds of Crime. The ACC noted (2011a) that organised 
crime shares both a profit motive and a business management approach with legitimate enterprises. 
The principal difference is that their business activities and profits are illicit (p.2 2011a). From, the ACC’s 
perspective, organised crime is another business albeit illicit.
The ACC (2011c) also produced a more detailed report entitled Organised Crime in Australia. The ACC 
presented a model of organised crime in Australia that is more closely aligned with the entrepreneurial model 
described above. 
In Australia, organised crime involves a highly interconnected milieu of criminally minded groups and 
individuals, which come together as opportunities arise. Organised crime groups in this country vary 
significantly in sophistication, structure and modus operandi, dependant on their perceptions of the 
opportunities and threats that exist at that time… Rapidly evolving and temporary criminal structures and 
capabilities create problems for government and law enforcement agencies in identifying and ‘triaging’ 
targets and aligning operational and legislative responses. (p.28)
The ACC identified a number of business structures for organised crime. These are summarised in Table 4 on 
the following page.
The role of the entrepreneur in organised crime
A key feature of flexible business structures is their entrepreneurial approach. Smith (2010) reviewed the 
literature relating to entrepreneurial criminal activity describing organised crime ‘as an enterprising community 
and as enterprising people’ (p.256). Smith argued that entrepreneurship characterises both licit and illicit 
business activities and, when seen from that perspective, the blurring of the boundary between legal and 
illegal activities previously noted is readily understood. We have previously noted the deleterious effect of 
organised crime on the legal economy; however, Smith reported instances of cases where legitimate business 
depended on the existence of organised crime operating in the community. In effect, crime supports the 
legitimate economy and the legitimate economy supports crime. Smith, again in common with previous 
themes, argued that flexibility and networking in a loosely linked community of crime are significant factors in 
entrepreneurial success. The entrepreneur is driven by the need to profit from new and different opportunities.
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Table 4. Organised crime business structures identified by the Australian Crime Commission
Structure Description
Traditional hierarchical Historically, organised crime structures tended to be based on existing ethnic or cultural groups, 
e.g. the Sicilian Mafia or the Yakuza in Japan. These groups borrowed hierarchical business 
structures and operations typical of the legitimate economy. Such structures retain influence in 
specific criminal markets. However, such rigid structures are inherently more susceptible to law 
enforcement disruption and this has prompted many to adopt more flexible structures such as 
those outlined below.
Networked These structures employ a hybrid hierarchical model to refine methodologies, to repair damage 
caused by disruption and to protect members. Transnational organised crime in Australia has 
increasingly adopted this business structure. Relationships between individuals and groups are 
based upon shared resource and enterprise rather than the historical basis of shared ethnicity 
or culture.
The ACC cites evidence for temporary alliances between transnational and domestic criminal 
groups for major projects such as the importation of illicit drugs.
Some criminal identities assume the role of consultant to or coordinator of separate criminal 
groups to promote common interests. These interests may extend beyond illicit activities into 
the legitimate economy. The flexibility of these arrangements allows the extension of domestic 
operations overseas and vice versa.
Net-centric These groups use the Internet as the primary source of communication between disparate 
criminal groups. Internet communications provide greater protection against law enforcement 
interventions. They also provide access to specialist skills and criminal methodologies across the 
network and allow for the development of specific criminal projects.
Resilient networks – a composite 
model
The most resilient crime groups in Australia tend to incorporate features from all of the structures 
indicated above. Typical such groups:
•	 engage in a variety of criminal markets often as a result of noting changes in consumer 
demands,
•	 involve people with specialist skill and knowledge,
•	 collaborate with other crime groups on specific projects, and
•	 protect themselves from disruption by law enforcement by gaining knowledge of law 
enforcement techniques.
Compiled from material in Australian Crime Commission (2011c, pp.29–32)
Smith was primarily concerned with the entrepreneur in an organisational setting. Frith and McElwee (2007), 
on the other hand, described the rise of a single entrepreneur (nickname Tom) acting initially alone supplying 
illicit drugs at a university in the United Kingdom. Tom arrived at university and was impressed by the 
opportunity to provide illicit drugs to new students with no existing source of supply. Tom worked primarily 
on a trial and error basis to balance supply and demand. He was driven to wholesale by the perceived risk 
associated with dealing directly with a large numbers of clients and by the intrusive effect drug dealing was 
having on his personal life. He displayed initiative in organising other wholesalers into supporting each other. 
He finally retired when his wholesale business began to intrude into his personal life. Tom shared many 
characteristics with larger scale enterprises. He made extensive use of networks, integrated other wholesalers 
rather than compete against them, and paid close attention to perceived risk by minimising contact within 
networks. This study supports the notion that entrepreneurial behaviour fuels organised crime. It is somewhat 
different in that, at least as far as Tom was concerned, a comfortable social life was at least as important as 
the profit motive, and eventually more so.
A business model of drug trafficking operations
As a general observation, analyses of illicit drug trafficking tend to rely on models of the drug market rather 
than models of the business per se. In the absence of a business model for drug trafficking, we reviewed the 
literature especially with respect to similar crime types. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
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Europe (Aronowitz et al. 2010) has provided a detailed analysis of the business model for people trafficking. 
People trafficking has many features in common with the global movement of illicit drugs employing similar 
techniques and similar resources. Aronowitz et al. (2010) provides a template for the development of a 
business model for illicit drug trafficking (see Table 5). The rationale for proceeds of crime legislation for people 
trafficking is very similar to that for drug trafficking:
Financial investigations should be an integral part of a human trafficking investigation. Huge sums of 
money generated through the exploitation of trafficked persons can be either reinvested in the trafficking 
business or in the legitimate economy. Financial investigations will help trace the links and contacts that 
traffickers have with the upperworld, identify which upperworld branches are most at risk and which 
companies collude with traffickers.
Financial intelligence units with the necessary expertise should investigate money laundering practices. 
Following the identification of investments generated through illicit activities, governments should 
initiate steps to seize and confiscate assets. Measures should be implemented to compensate victims 
of trafficking and exploitation—a measure which, in addition to others, serves to decrease the profits 
generated through illicit activities. (Aronowitz et al. [2010], p.72)
Table 5. A basic supply chain model of trafficking in human beings
Supplier Assembly/ 
Manufacturing
Retailer/Service Provider Customer
At this stage victims are 
‘sourced’ by various 
means—travel agencies, 
employment agencies, 
‘lover boys’, peers and 
family etc
Transport of victims to 
point of exploitation
Provision of travel 
documents, if necessary 
Collection and use/ 
reinvestment of revenues
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and 
perceived risk
In case of labour exploitation: 
goods are being produced (actual 
point of exploitation)
In all cases: victims are 
manipulated to achieve:
•	 training victims in necessary 
skills
•	 compliance/ obedience 
according to the will of 
traffickers through coercion, 
use of force, or alternative 
means of creating 
vulnerability
Quality controls => Traffickers 
need to ensure satisfaction of 
their clients
Choice of marketing channel (= 
means of communicating their 
offers to customers)
Choice of customer type:
1. Businesses
2. Private customers
Mode of sale (where and how to 
offer goods/services for purchase)
Collection and use/ reinvestment 
of revenues
Choice of competitive strategy:
1. Differentiation
2. Price
3. Quality
Customers choose products and 
services based on:
1. Price
2. Quality
3. Variety of functions
4. Ease of consumption
5. Presentation of goods and 
services
Purchase (goods and services)
Level of awareness in terms of 
involvement in the trafficking 
process varies
Source: Aronowitz, Theuermann & Tyurykanova (2010) p.34
The report also made a number of recommendations in relation to the business of people trafficking, which 
again are relevant to the business of drug trafficking including:
•	 To achieve long term disruption, law enforcement strategies should focus on the business side of criminal 
activities 
•	 The confiscation of criminal assets should be a key strategy in the disruption of people trafficking 
•	 All investigations into people trafficking should include financial investigations (Aronowitz et al. [2010] pp. 
82–85)
It appears that there is a great deal of commonality between approaches to the problem of people trafficking 
and that of drug trafficking. We suggest that the Supply Chain Model for people trafficking could be applied, 
with a few modifications to drug trafficking. Table 6 provides details of such a model.
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Table 6. A basic supply chain model of illicit drug trafficking
Production Transportation Retail Consumer
Cultivation/production of raw 
drug/precursor
Transport of illicit drug to 
consumer market
Wholesalers purchase from 
manufacturer and distribute to 
retailers
Established retailer–consumer 
relationships pose less risk to 
both retailer and consumer
Manufacture/refinement of illicit 
drug
Transport funded either by 
manufacturer or by wholesaler 
or both
Transport across national 
borders requires additional 
planning
Retailers provide drugs to 
regular customers and new 
customers.
Customer chooses product 
based on
•	 Cost
•	 Quality
•	 Perceived risk
Collection and reinvestment of 
revenues
Collection and reinvestment of 
revenues
Collection and reinvestment of 
revenues
Consumer experiences the 
social, psychological and 
physiological impact of drugs.
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and perceived 
risk
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and 
perceived risk
Revenues are related to 
competition, costs and 
perceived risk
This model necessarily simplifies relationships between stages. For example, in some cases, the progression 
from cultivation/production to manufacture/refinement may involve the transfer of product across national 
boundaries. The number of entities involved in the supply chain can vary considerably. There might be one or 
more groups involved at each and every point, and profits occur at each step across the supply spectrum. 
Highly developed organisations may control the entire chain so that the profit occurs at the point of retail.
Certainly within the course of our discussion with various law enforcement agencies, it was suggested that 
for some drug types the supply chain has an hourglass shape. The greatest number of individuals occurs at 
either end of the spectrum—the cultivation/production stage and consumers. There are fewer manufacturers 
than producers and fewer again undertaking the specialised role of transportation across national borders. 
On the distribution side, there are more wholesalers than transport specialists and more retailers than 
wholesalers. The implication is that the most vulnerable area, simply in terms of the number of players, is in 
the centre of the hourglass. It was noted earlier that organised crime had adopted more flexible arrangements 
for its activities. Such a strategy is consistent with the notion that it is the centre of the hourglass where risk is 
greatest. It is also the area where the revenues generated by the illicit drug trade are most concentrated.
Again, we should remind ourselves that models are necessarily a simplification of complex interactions in 
the real world. Good models help us to identify critical causal factors in multifaceted phenomena and by so 
doing improve our ability to predict and indeed control events. The clandestine nature of drug trafficking is one 
factor restraining the development of a business model of drug trafficking. The other factor is the variability 
in drug trafficking operations. From an Australian perspective, it is worthwhile noting the distinction between 
drugs that are produced for the most part locally, such as cannabis and the amphetamines, and drugs of 
importation, such as heroin, ecstasy and cocaine. In our model of drug trafficking, transportation is more 
significant for drugs of importation than locally produced drugs. It is the transfer across national borders 
that poses the greatest threat to the successful importation of drugs into Australia. The issues surrounding 
transportation of locally produced drugs are minimal especially with regard to cannabis. Furthermore, Willis 
(2008) noted that the majority of cannabis consumed in Australia was not supplied by drug dealers but rather 
obtained gratis or purchased from social contacts in private residences. Nicholas (2008) has also argued for 
the importance of not-for-profit distribution of illegal drugs at the end point of the retail chain.
26
Targeting the Profits of Illicit Drug Trafficking through Proceeds of Crime Action
3.2 Implications for our study
The consideration of drug trafficking as a business provides an entirely different perspective to the issue of 
the impact of proceeds of crime from that provided by the literature review. The literature review, it will be 
recalled, tended to be pessimistic about the potential for proceeds of crime and money laundering legislation 
to disrupt crime. There are some interesting reflections on specific criticisms arising from the literature review 
of proceeds of crime.
One of the major concerns was the apparent lack of evidence of any impact on key organised crime figures. 
From a business model perspective, this might be expected. If modern organised crime is comprised of 
shifting allegiances and cooperation between individuals and cells in one or more broadly based criminal 
groups, then such a result is to be anticipated. The hypothesis that proceeds of crime action should be 
directed at major crime figures is based on the unstated assumption that organised crime exhibits a concrete, 
hierarchical structure. As the literature shows, such an assumption is not consistent with modern notions of 
the structure of organised crime.
Adopting a business model of organised crime also gives us a clear indication of why proceeds of crime 
are important. All business models of organised crime assume that profit is the primary motive of such 
businesses, as it is with legitimate business enterprises. On that assumption, one would expect that 
successful proceeds of crime action would be disruptive to the business of crimes. Proceeds of crime action 
per se cannot be without value unless the business model of crime is wrong and that seems highly unlikely. 
If criticisms of proceeds of crime/money laundering efforts are to be sustained, they must be directed at the 
application of such regulations rather than the concept itself.
In conclusion, recognition of the ‘business’ nature of organised crime refutes many of the criticisms met with 
in the literature that has, in our opinion, focused too narrowly on the technicalities of proceeds of crime and 
money laundering regimes rather than recognising the broader theoretical framework within which these 
regimes exist. The adoption of an appropriate business model also assists us to identify the point in the supply 
chain where proceeds action may be most effective. With imported drugs, the most vulnerable point would 
appear to be the transportation of illicit drugs across national borders.
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4 Estimating the impact of proceeds 
of crime activity
One of the principal aims of our project has been to develop a measure of the impact of proceeds of 
crime action on the criminal enterprise; in effect, the disruption to ongoing criminal activity by proceeds of 
crime enforcement. 
As noted previously, proceeds of crime tends to be reported in terms of the dollar amount confiscated or 
forfeited. Furthermore, the reported amount is usually that remaining after maintenance and disposal costs 
have been subtracted. It is important, of course, to have an exact estimate of the amount of proceeds 
that are deposited in government coffers and prudent to have an understanding of the costs associated 
with successful prosecution of proceeds of crime. However, neither the revenue derived from confiscation/
forfeiture, nor revenue adjusted by costs incurred is a good indicator of the impact of proceeds of crime action 
on the criminal enterprise.
It is argued that the proper measure of impact is the cost to the criminal enterprise. A simple real life example 
will demonstrate the difference between amount forfeited and the cost to the criminal enterprise. As part 
of proceeds of crime action in one jurisdiction, a luxury car was targeted by the investigating authority and 
eventually forfeited. The car was valued initially at $120,000 and was maintained for 12 months before being 
sold at auction. Taking into account maintenance and auction expenses, the amount received for the car was 
approximately $30,000. Therefore, the ‘benefit’ to the government was 25% of the real cost to the criminal. 
Admittedly, this is an extreme example presented for illustrative purposes. A more realistic estimate of the 
impact of legal, maintenance and disposal costs was provided by an analysis of proceeds of crime data 
from the Australian Federal Police. Based on information from 115 successful proceeds of crime actions 
relating to illicit drug investigations since 1995, the results suggested that the final amount appropriated was 
approximately 87% of the estimated cost to the criminal enterprise. In other words, add-on costs relating to 
assets seized are approximately 13% of the original value. The imbalance between ‘benefit to government’ 
and ‘cost to criminal’ will also be influenced by the type of asset. Liquid assets tend to maintain their original 
value. The major source of diminution will be where legal costs could be awarded against proceeds. Non-
liquid assets will tend to show variation between their original value and their value at disposal. Cars, boats 
and similar assets will require maintenance and be subject to depreciation with age. Real estate, of course, 
can be subject to the influence of the market and may increase or decrease in value during the course of 
the investigation. It should be recognised that court cases involving proceeds can be lengthy and, especially 
where large amounts are involved, subject to appeal.
It is further argued that the immediate cost to the criminal enterprise is not equivalent to the future cost to the 
criminal enterprise. Again a simple example will illustrate the point. Imagine that proceeds of crime action has 
deprived the criminal enterprise of $100,000 in cash. Assuming that this amount was to be reinvested in drugs 
and that such an investment returned $10 for every one dollar invested, then the criminal enterprise has been 
effectively denied future earnings of $1 million and after a further iteration, $10 million. Again, the example is an 
over-simplification of what occurs in the real world. It is clear, however, that the downstream impact of proceeds 
of crime action in the present has the potential for significant disruption of the criminal enterprise.
There are issues that need to be considered:
•	 It is unlikely that the profitability of drug trafficking will be uniform across type of illicit drug, level of 
criminal involvement (ie producer, importer, distributor, dealer) or geographical location. Profitability will 
also vary over time.
•	 As identified in the literature review, not all proceeds of crime are reinvested in illegitimate activity. Some 
funds find their way into legitimate investments, such as shares and real estate, and some support the 
lifestyle of the criminals involved.
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•	 Lag times between investment and profit are also important if we wish to predict impact over successive 
iterations. Should we define future impact in terms of the next six months, one year or two years?
This chapter will consider what we know about each of the above issues using findings from the literature 
review, expert opinion and data analysis. It will then provide a method for determining the downstream impact 
of successful proceeds of crime action. The authors have dubbed this measure the Proceeds of Crime Drug 
Disruption Index (POCDDI). The chapter will conclude with consideration of the applications and limitations of 
the POCDDI.
4.1 Profitability and the drug market
Any attempt to measure downstream reinvestment opportunities must be based on the profitability of drug 
trafficking. Profitability will be influenced by market conditions, which in turn will be influenced by a large array 
of factors including type of drug, geographical location, position in the drug supply chain, level of drug law 
enforcement, and general economic wellbeing and stability.
Adkins (unpublished, pp85-86) also provided information on the profitability of the Australian drug market by 
type of drug and level in the supply chain. It should be noted that Adkins employed three separate models of 
the Australian drug market. We have chosen the Elasticity Adjusted Model and the UN Model to calculate the 
profitability of the Australian drug market across two dimensions. These two models used different primary 
datasets. The excluded model was unadjusted for demand elasticity. Results were very similar to the elasticity 
adjusted model. They were excluded to simplify reporting. More detail on elasticity and its relevance to this 
study is given in Attachment B.
Adkins provided estimates of revenue and profits by class of drugs and at different levels of the supply 
chain (producer/distributor/dealer). We used these to calculate cost (cost=revenue—profit) for all drug types 
by supply chain level. It should be noted that the Adkins model is relevant to a number of phases in the 
development of our proposed Index. A short summary of that paper and copies of relevant tables and findings 
are provided at Attachment B.
Profitability was measured in terms of return on investment or dollars of revenue generated for every cost dollar.
      Revenue 
Profitability = -------------- 
        Cost
Table 7. Revenue, cost, profitability of the Australian illicit drug market
Elasticity Adj. model Revenue Profit Cost Profitability
Producer/Importer $683,648,950 $642,693,925 $40,955,025 16.7
Distributor $4,509,051,333 $3,648,652,742 $860,398,591 5.2
Dealer $5,550,302,452 $3,460,356,000 $2,089,946,452 2.7
Total $10,743,002,735 $7,751,702,667 $2,991,300,068 3.6
UN Model Revenue Profit Cost Profitability
Producer/Importer $1,212,265,173 $1,136,192,526 $76,072,647 15.9
Distributor $7,353,239,196 $5,866,086,788 $1,487,152,408 4.9
Dealer $11,226,706,665 $6,398,335,594 $4,828,371,071 2.3
Total $19,792,211,034 $13,400,614,908 $6,391,596,126 3.1
Overall, those in the illicit drug trade received $3.60 for every dollar invested according to the Elasticity 
Adjusted Model and $3.10 according to the UN Model (see Table 7). Table 7 also confirms the widely held 
belief supported by expert opinion that the upper levels of the supply chain are more profitable than the lower 
levels. An importer/producer receives $16–17 for every dollar invested; for distributors it is $5 and for dealers 
$2–3. The difference between the two models is not of practical importance. Although the models differ in 
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terms of their respective amounts of drugs supplied and therefore total revenue and profit, they share many 
assumptions about the profitability at different levels in the supply chain.
It is also possible to produce profitability ratios by drug type and again, this demonstrates the variance in 
profitability. For both models, overall profitability ranged from 2.8 for ecstasy to 10.6 for heroin. It is important 
to note that proceeds of crime action cannot be linked directly to a single type of drug in each and every 
investigation. We decided therefore that it was preferable to use an all drug average rather than specific 
estimates for specific drugs.
From our discussion with expert groups, it was concluded that the bulk of proceeds of crime action is 
targeted at the higher end of the supply chain. In view of the profitability figures provided in Adkins, this makes 
good sense. It also raises the issue of whether a version of the proposed POCDDI should be developed that 
is limited to higher level participants in the illicit drug trade. Table 8 provides profitability ratios for a combined 
producer/importer and distributor level.
Table 8. Revenue, cost, profit and profitability of distributors and producers/importers combined
 Revenue Profit Cost Profitability
Elasticity Adj. Model $5,192,700,283 $4,291,346,667 $901,353,616 5.8
UN Model $8,565,504,369 $7,002,279,314 $1,563,225,055 5.5
The combined results in Table 8 excluded street level dealers and returned profitability ratios of 5.8 for the 
Elasticity Adjusted Model and 5.5 for the UN Model. These results are considerably higher than those for all 
participants in drug trafficking.
4.2 Criminal investment in legitimate and illegitimate 
enterprises
In Chapter 2, it was stated that ‘the most severe consequence of criminal funds is the further perpetuation 
and promotion of criminal activities’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, p.8). A study in the 
Netherlands reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011, p.99) suggest that on average 
criminals spent 7% of their income on lifestyle, 57% on legitimate investments and the remaining 36% on 
reinvestment in criminal enterprises or irregular activities. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
concluded that a higher percentage of criminals involved in drug trafficking hoarded cash for reinvestment 
(77%) than criminals involved in other criminal activities (54%). It is highly unlikely that the proportion of 
criminal proceeds reinvested in crime will be constant across nations or even within nations. An approach 
more relevant to the Australia context uses Australian data provided in Adkins (unpublished). As described 
above, Adkins estimated both revenue and profit across drug types and level of the supply chain (producer/
distributor/dealer). We have summed these results across drug type and supply chain level to estimate 
total revenue at $19.8 billion and expected profit $13.4 billion. As before, cost is equal to total revenue less 
expected profit; in this case $6.4 billion or 32% of revenue.
These results are relevant to the entire trade in illicit drugs. From expert opinion and consideration of the data, 
it is apparent that proceeds of crime action tends to be targeted at criminals involved in large-scale production 
or importation and wholesaling. In order to examine what the reinvestment practice of these groups might 
be, we considered the type of assets that were seized or forfeited ($4.9 million in drug-related cases) by the 
Australian Federal Police. Cash accounted for 56% of total value confiscated, bank accounts and bonds 10% 
and the remaining 34% non-liquid assets (primarily property, motor vehicles and water vessels). On the basis 
of expert opinion, it would appear the great majority of cash was destined for further drug trafficking and the 
same is probably true of a smaller percentage of assets held in bank accounts and bonds. In this context, 
the amount reinvested in further drug dealing would appear to be in the range 55–60% and the amount in 
legitimate enterprises 40–45%. As expected, these figures are higher than that implied by the aforementioned 
studies. This disparity arises from the fact that the Australian Federal Police target the high end of the supply 
chain, that is, importers and wholesalers, whereas the other studies included the broad base of retail dealers.
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On the basis of our own analysis of Australian data, the estimated level of reinvestment in further drug 
trafficking in Australia is set initially at 60%. Again, it must be emphasised that such point estimates will vary 
over time and place and it is important that this is acknowledged in the proposed POCDDI.
4.3 From crime to reinvestment
The final variable required for compiling a measure of the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action on the 
criminal enterprise is the reinvestment period or the lag time between purchase and sale of illicit drugs. At 
the retail end of the market, the lag time is presumably based entirely on the time taken to sell a given stock 
of drugs. Obviously it would be extremely difficult to measure a lag time that might be extremely variable 
depending on the size of the wholesale purchase and the speed at which this can be sold to drug users.
With drugs of importation, there is a very different scenario. The primary product for many imported drugs is 
seasonal and subject to the vicissitudes of transportation over long distances to Australia. Large-scale imports 
such as shipping container loads are often allowed to ‘rest’ to ensure that authorities have not detected the 
contents. Smithson et al. (2005) provided tentative evidence that the lag between a shipment of heroin arriving 
in Australia and its arrival at the street level was in the order of two months.
The problem is not quite so difficult if lag is described simply in terms of ‘churn’. Lag 1 is the first reinvestment 
of criminal proceeds in further illicit drug trafficking, while lag 2 is the second and so on. For the purposes of 
this study, it was decided to describe the revenue that would have been generated after lag 1 as the short-
term disruptive impact. The revenue after lag 2 would constitute the medium term disruptive impact.
4.4 Proceeds of Crime Drug Disruption Index (POCDDI)
One of the principal aims of our research was to produce an index of the social impact of proceeds of 
crime action. In this case, social impact is defined in terms of disruption of the criminal enterprise, which is 
measured by the funds denied to the criminal enterprise in the short and medium term. Funds denied are the 
revenue that would have been available to the criminal enterprise had it not been for successful proceeds of 
crime action by authorities.
The index or the crime disrupted per dollar of assets confiscated is calculated as follows:
POCDDI short term  = Profitability x Reinvestment Rate
POCDDI medium term = POCDDI short term 
2
Where: 
•	 Profitability is the ratio of revenue to cost
•	 Reinvestment is the proportion of fund reinvested in further criminal activity
•	 Short term is the position after one period of criminal activity (around 3 months)
•	 Medium term is the position after two periods of criminal activity (around 6 months)
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Table 9. Estimates of POCDDI short term and POCDDI medium term
Growth Model
Overall model Distributor Importer Producer Model
Profitability 3.6 5.8
Reinvestment rate 60% 60%
POCDDI 
short term
2.2 3.5
POCDDI 
medium term
4.6 11.9
Estimates are provided in Table 9. The growth model calculates the downstream effect of proceeds of 
crime action given assumptions drawn from the literature, expert opinion and our own analysis. Under these 
conditions, it is apparent that revenue will increase over time. The short-term impact, that is, the impact after a 
single lag, is a reduction in criminal funds of $2.20 for the Overall Model and $3.50 for the Distributor Importer 
Producer Model for every $1 of criminal proceeds confiscated. In the medium term, these savings are $4.60 
and $11.90 respectively. Given that the majority of proceeds of crime action is against individuals involved 
(a) in the production and/or importation of illicit drugs or their precursors, or (b) in the wholesale distribution 
of illicit drugs to retail dealers, it would appear reasonable to adopt the Distributor Importer Producer Model 
estimates. A further observation to support the exclusion of retail dealers is the relatively high proportion of 
illicit drugs consumed by this group. The not-for-profit dealers contribute to this result.
Having developed the POCDDI, it is possible to calculate stable revenue points for those involved in the 
illicit drug trade. The stable revenue point is the amount an individual needs to reinvest to provide a stable 
revenue flow. An iterative method was used in this case. In the Overall Model, the average participant requires 
a reinvestment of 28% to provide stable revenue; for the Distributor Importer Producer Model, it is 18%. If 
reinvestment dropped below this point, then revenues would continue to decline; conversely investment 
above this point would see a growth in business levels. 
4.5 Concluding comments
In summary, as a reasonable estimate of the impact of proceeds of crime action in Australia, a multiplier of 
3.5 should be adopted to measure short-term disruption and 11.9 to measure medium-term disruption. As a 
general rule of thumb, the short term is a period up to three months and the medium term up to six months. It 
should be noted that the medium term multiplier includes the short-term effect. The short term is a subset of 
the medium term; they are not mutually exclusive.
It is important to realise that the POCDDI should be applied to the value of an asset before maintenance, 
depreciation and other costs are applied. The use of estimated value of the asset rather than the actual 
amount forfeited to Treasury or other government body is consistent with our intention to measure the impact 
on the criminal enterprise rather than simply total amounts recovered.
The actual amount recovered is an important measure in its own right. If the intention is to make proceeds 
of crime activity self-funding, it is appropriate to use the actual amount recovered. If the intention is to 
measure social impact through disruption to the criminal enterprise then POCDDI is the appropriate 
measure. To use actual amount recovered to measure disruption to the criminal enterprise would, on the 
basis of these figures, result in a significant underestimation of the impact of proceeds of crime action. 
For example, it was reported earlier that Sproat (2007b) concluded that for every £1 of criminal assets 
recovered in the UK, costs of £3.73 were incurred. From a social impact perspective, we would suggest 
that, in fact, every pound invested in such action resulted in £11.9 of disruption in the medium term. This 
result is equivalent to a 3.2:1 return on investment.
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It should be remembered that any index of social impact will be based on average impacts and as such will 
overestimate the impact of some individual cases and underestimate others. These indices are designed for 
use at an aggregate level, for example, total proceeds confiscated in one year, rather than for a specific case.
We considered developing more specific POCDDIs that would identify separate multipliers according to 
geographic location, more detailed position in the supply chain (we partly met this by excluding retailed 
dealers from our preferred model), and type of drug involved. Separate measures of profitability and 
reinvestment in crime could be developed by state/territory from Adkins (unpublished) and other sources. 
In our view, such an undertaking would put considerable pressure on the available data. It would also make 
calculating the social impact of proceeds of crime, where the crime or assets are spread across categories, 
complex and onerous for law enforcement agencies (eg a bikie gang that was involved in both cannabis and 
amphetamines across a number of jurisdictions). Of course, the final sum of results across all cases should 
not differ substantially from our proposed composite solution. In our view, the costs and risks associated with 
the development of multiple specific POCDDIs outweigh the benefits.
In terms of future direction for this type of analysis, the ability to identify reinvestment points where future 
revenues become stable and below which they fall has some potential to inform policy and strategic decisions 
with regard to the application of proceeds of crime. This point will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion.
Finally, one caveat should be considered. The POCDDI is a model built on other models of the illicit drug 
market and the funding of criminal activities. This is no different from other scientific models where new 
models are built from the findings of older models. The difference is that the foundations and superstructure of 
those sciences are far more securely based than what was available in the present case. Illicit drug trafficking 
is by definition illegal and therefore often hidden. There are sizable differences in estimates of the size of the 
market, its value, its profitability, the number of users, their consumption patterns and so on. We have tried to 
address these concerns in a number of ways. 
•	 Our model is conservative in its inclusion of potential negative impacts. It does not include estimates of 
the negative impacts on society of the use of criminal funds to invest in legitimate enterprises. It is also 
concerned solely with the ability of criminals to ply their trade. It does not include the often significant health 
and productivity costs associated with the use of illicit drugs.
•	 As noted above, we used wherever possible data aggregated across Australia.
•	 The results for the Overall Model provide a baseline estimate of the potential disruption to criminal activity. 
Retail dealers share many characteristics of the drug user community to the extent that some dealers are 
not-for-profit and others limit their profit to the amount required for their own consumption. As previously 
noted, such individuals are unlikely to be the target of proceeds of crime action. The Overall Model should 
be considered a conservative estimate.
•	 The POCDDI is an estimate of the impact on the specific criminal enterprise. It can be assumed that publicised 
proceeds of crime actions have a general deterrent effect on criminal activity. Such effects are difficult to 
quantify and have been excluded from our analysis. Again, our estimates should be considered conservative.
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5 Conducting successful proceeds of 
crime investigations
5.1 Towards more effective and efficient proceeds of 
crime investigations
A key aim of the research is to provide advice to law enforcement regarding how proceeds of crime actions 
can be made more effective and efficient. To support this aim, it is important to understand empirically what 
factors are associated with successful proceeds of crime action, what proceeds of crime cases look like 
with respect to key variables and where the greatest potential value lies for law enforcement. This chapter 
examines data provided by the Australian Federal Police in order to address these questions. 
To provide the most rigorous estimates possible, data was included from both drug-related and non drug-
related cases. As the proceeds of crime process is separate from the predicate offence, the data should 
remain comparable. This supposition is supported by findings (presented below) that fail to show significant 
differences in outcomes between proceeds of crime cases based on different predicate offences. By using 
this additional data, we are able to provide more precise estimates of effects of the predictors than would be 
possible with only drug-related proceeds of crime data. Indeed, given changes in the legislative framework 
and the nature of the illicit drug markets over time, it is unlikely that a large enough number of drug related 
proceeds of crime cases could be selected unless there was a significant increase in the volume of drug 
cases passing through a proceeds of crime process. 
5.2 Descriptive analysis of proceeds of crime cases 
Data 
Data for the analysis are taken from the Australian Federal Police database and include all assets from 
proceeds of crime actions associated with cases opened on or after 1 January 2003 and closed before 30 
June 2011. In total, 1,273 assets were included in the original data. A small number of assets (n=29) were 
discarded due to inconsistencies in the case record that could not be resolved, leaving 1,244 assets (98.5% 
of the original data) associated with 269 cases for consideration. In addition, all statistical models were fitted 
to the data both including and excluding a particularly large case, which accounted for 212 assets, to test 
for sensitivity of the overall estimates to the peculiarities of that case. As our substantive conclusions were 
unchanged, we opted to retain the case in the final set of models presented here. 
An asset was deemed to have a ‘successful’ outcome if its final status was forfeited to the Commonwealth 
and ‘unsuccessful’ otherwise. Of the 1,244 assets included in the analysis, 601 (48.3%) were successfully 
forfeited or disposed. ‘Successful’ was coded as 1 and ‘unsuccessful’ as 0 in the key outcome variable. Other 
variables considered in the analysis included (for each asset) time elapsed in years between a case being 
reported and the asset restrained, time elapsed in years between asset restraint and the final case outcome, 
the type of asset restrained, the offence type associated with the case and the estimated value of the asset. 
Type of asset includes the categories ‘Liquid assets’, ‘Real estate—commercial’, ‘Real estate—residential’ 
and ‘Other’. Offence types include ‘Fraud’, ‘Civil proceeding’, ‘Drugs’, ‘Money laundering’ and ‘Other’. Last, 
we also considered the estimated value of the asset. For analysis purposes this was transformed using the 
natural logarithm of the value.
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Table 10. Proceeds of crime data summary statistics 
Case variables (n = 269)
Crime type
Fraud 69 (25.7%)
Civil proceeding 38 (14.1%)
Drugs 70 (26.0%)
Money laundering 68 (25.3%)
Other 24 (8.9%)
Asset variables (n = 1,244)
Proceeds of crime outcome
Successful 601 (48.3%)
Unsuccessful 643 (51.7%)
Asset type
Liquid assets 513 (41.2%)
Real estate – commercial 262 (21.1%)
Real estate – residential 239 (19.2%)
Other 230 (18.5%)
Asset value
Mean $374,025 ($1,156,328)
Median (Interquartile Range) $93,200 ($249,685)
Years elapsed between:
Case reported and asset restrained 1.36 (1.40)
Asset restrained and final asset status 1.85 (1.65)
Note: displayed values for asset value and time elapsed variables are Mean (Standard Deviation) Data drawn from  Australian Federal Police records
This transformation was chosen to produce a variable with a distribution that was most closely approximated 
by the normal probability distribution, given the highly positively skewed distribution of the raw asset value. 
Table 10 presents summary statistics of the variables under consideration. For continuous variables (asset value, 
elapsed time between case reported and asset restrained, elapsed time between asset restrained and final asset 
status) means and standard deviations are presented, while percentages in each category are presented for 
categorical variables (crime type, successful/unsuccessful proceeds of crime outcome, asset type). 
The results show that Fraud (25.7%), Drugs (26.0%) and Money Laundering (25.3%) each make up about a 
quarter of the cases in our data, with the remainder of cases split between Civil Proceeding (14.1%) and Other 
(8.9%). Of the 1,244 assets, 601 (48.3%) resulted in a successful proceeds of crime outcome. Liquid assets 
were approximately two-fifths of the assets (41.2%), while Commercial Real Estate (21.1%), Residential Real 
Estate (19.2%) and Other assets (18.5%) each roughly represented one-fifth of the data. Average asset value 
was $374,025, with a standard deviation of $1,156,328. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of asset values for all assets and forfeited assets by case value
Figure 3. Proportion of assets forfeited by case value
Time elapsed between case reported and asset restraint averaged 1.36 years (SD=1.40) and time between 
asset restraint and final asset status averaged 1.85 years (SD=1.65). 
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Follow the money: Distribution of value
An important consideration for law enforcement agencies pursuing proceeds of crime action is the expected 
return or damage to the criminal. Figures 2 and 3 address this question, illustrating the rate of ‘successful’ 
proceeds of crime action over deciles of total case asset value, as well as the percentage of total value and 
the percentage of successful asset value. 
The data show that the raw rate of asset level success declines for higher value cases, from approximately 
three-quarters successful for the lowest decile of case value to around a third for the highest (although it 
is noteworthy that excluding data for the very large case mentioned above increases the rate of success 
in the top decile to nearly 50%). Furthermore, a very high percentage of both the total asset value (80.4%) 
and successful asset value (66. 4%) are contained in the top 10% of cases. Thus, despite the lower rate of 
success in higher value (and presumably more complex and difficult) cases, it is clear that the bulk of the 
potential (and actual) impact of proceeds of crime action is concentrated in the top decile of cases with the 
highest monetary value. 
5.3 Multivariate analysis of proceeds of crime asset 
outcomes
In order to better understand the factors associated with successful or unsuccessful outcomes in proceeds of 
crime cases, a series of multivariate analyses were undertaken. The purpose of these analyses was to assess 
the relationships between a ‘successful’ outcome of the proceeds of crime action with respect to each asset 
and other potentially important predictors including the type of offence, the type of asset, the asset value and the 
time elapsed in certain ‘asset states’. A further advantage of multivariate analyses is that simultaneous effects of 
the predictors are ‘controlled’ for, giving a better estimate of the actual effect of each factor on the outcome. 
Modeling strategy
Successful or unsuccessful proceeds of crime outcomes were modeled with a multilevel logistic regression 
model, with assets nested within cases. This model accounts for the case-clustering by allowing a random 
intercept at the case level, while allowing the effects of predictors at both the case and asset level to be 
modeled simultaneously. Using this framework, two models were estimated using stata 11.2, MLwiN and 
the user-written runmlwin command (Browne 2009; Leckie & Charlton 2011; Rasbash et al. 2005). The 
first model fitted to the data was a variance components model with no substantive predictors, which was 
estimated via Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation. A burn in period of 500 iterations and a chain 
of 5,000 iterations was used for this model. The purpose of the variance components model is to explore 
what proportion of variation in the outcome (success or failure of the proceeds of crime process) is between 
assets or between cases. The second model includes all predictors listed above, and uses a burn in of 50,000 
iterations and a chain of 200,000 iterations. 
A number of alternative modeling approaches were also considered for the available data. In the first instance, 
due to the theoretical interest in case duration as related to asset outcomes, multilevel competing hazards 
models were considered (Steele et al. 1996). A competing hazards model is used to model the expected 
duration until an event occurs, where there is more than one possible event of interest (in this case, the 
competing events are that the asset status is finalised as successful or that the asset status is finalised 
as unsuccessful). The model is defined as multilevel due to the clustering of assets within cases, which 
necessitates some method of accounting for the case-clustering in order to produce unbiased coefficient 
estimates. This model was, however, discarded due to diagnostic tests indicating that the estimates were 
unstable. The instability is likely to be caused by the very high level of case-level clustering in both duration 
and final successful/unsuccessful result. 
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Results
Table 11 presents the variance components and final models, both estimated via MCMC and the final model 
including only predictors with either statistical or theoretical significance. The estimated Intra-Class Correlation 
(ICC) of 0.827 (95% Credible Interval [CrI]: 0.745-0.884) for the variance components model illustrates the 
very high level of case based clustering in outcomes, suggesting that nearly 83% of total variance in the 
probability of a successful outcome is between cases and only 17% between assets within a case. This 
is reinforced by the very high value of the Median Odds Ratio (MOR) (Larsen & Merlo 2005; Larsen et al. 
2000) of 43.789 (95% CrI: 19.188–118.345), indicating that the median expected increase in the odds of a 
successful outcome were an asset associated with a different case with a higher likelihood of success is over 
40 times.
Results from the final model show a number of significant effects, but indicate that the unexplained case-level 
variation is comparatively much more important than the effects of the observed parameters in determining 
successful seizure of an asset. This conclusion is supported by comparison of the estimated MOR of 69.43 
with the much lower estimated odds ratios for the predictors. Further, the bulk of unexplained variance 
(approximately 86%) remains between cases. 
Time elapsed between asset restraint and finalisation of asset status is significantly associated with reduced 
chances of success. The estimated odds ratio of 0.67 (95% CrI: 0.53–0.83) suggests that each year an 
asset is restrained reduces the odds of success by approximately a third, or between half and a sixth taking 
into account the credible range of the parameter. Time from first case report to asset restraint was a non-
significant predictor. 
Results for asset category indicated that the reference category of liquid assets (such as cash) were most 
likely to be successfully forfeited in proceeds of crime action. Commercial real estate was not significantly 
different from liquid assets in the likelihood of successful forfeiture. Residential real estate and ‘Other’ assets 
by contrast were much less likely to be forfeited successfully, with odds ratios of 0.15 and 0.16 respectively. 
These results suggests that there are two broad tiers of assets with liquid assets and commercial real estate 
most likely to be forfeited and residential real estate and other assets displaying much lower odds of success. 
Results for case offence type indicate that no category is significantly different from the reference category 
of fraud in the likelihood of success. This result is important in that it supports the decision to combine data 
relating to multiple crime types instead of limiting the analysis strictly to drug crime-related cases. 
Log asset estimated value was not significantly associated with success or failure in the final model. It 
is, however, worth noting that results from the third model (not shown) including all predictors showed a 
marginally significant positive effect for log asset value on successful forfeiture (Odds Ratio = 1.19, 95% CrI: 
1.00–1.40). 
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Table 11. Variance components and final models of successful vs. unsuccessful proceeds of crime outcomes
Variance components model Final model
Fixed parameters
Estimate 95% CrI Estimate 95% CrI
Constant 1.16 (0.64-1.77) 1.19 (-1.58–2.69)
Odds ratio 95% CrI Odds ratio 95% CrI
Elapsed years from case first 
reported-asset restrained
1.20 (0.86–1.66)
Elapsed years from asset 
restrained-final asset status
0.67*** (0.53–0.83)
Asset Category (ref. Liquid assets)
     Real estate – commercial 0.75 (0.08–3.14)
     Real estate – residential 0.15*** (0.05–0.32)
     Other 0.16 *** (0.06–0.32)
Case Offence Type (ref. Fraud)
     Civil proceedinga 0.71 (0.04–3.28)
     Drugsa 7.87 (0.88–32.62)
     Money laundering 1.85 (0.18–7.85)
     Other 1.95 (0.06–10.73)
Log asset estimated value 1.16 (1.00–1.37)
Random parameters
Case level variance (95% CrI) 15.70 (9.59–25.04) 19.76 (12.01–31.34)
Summary statistics
N (assets) 1,244 1,244
N (cases) 269 269
Intra-Class Correlation (95% CrI) 0.83 (0.74–0.88) 0.86 (0.78–0.91)
Median Odds Ratio (95% CrI) 43.79 (19.19–118.35) 69.43 (27.26–208.59)
95% CrI = 95% Credible Interval; *** = p<0.001;
a) post hoc tests indicate that the estimated odds of success for assets associated with ‘Drugs’ cases are significantly higher than for assets 
associated with ‘Civil Proceeding’ cases (OR=12.81, p=0.026). 
Variance components model estimated in MLwiN 2.02 via MCMC, with a burn in of 500 iterations and a chain of 5,000 iterations. Final model 
estimated with burn in of 50,000 iterations and a chain of 200,000 iterations. 
ICC estimated via the linear threshold method (Goldstein et al. 2002; Snijders & Bosker 1999)
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It is important to note that the available data provides only weak support for estimation of a suitable model. 
This is due to the very high level of case clustering (meaning that there is only a limited amount of variance in 
outcomes at the asset level) and a large number of cases with only a very small number of associated assets. 
Additionally, because the data were designed for administrative rather than research purposes, there is no 
information available on many potentially important factors and items in the data are often poorly suited to 
statistical analysis.  
The consequence of these factors is that the credible ranges of ‘true’ values for the parameters in our model 
are wide, as for instance in the case of the comparison between commercial real estate and liquid assets, 
where the credible interval of the odds ratio indicates that the odds of successfully seizing commercial real 
estate may range from 12 times less likely to three times more likely. While a number of significant effects 
emerge nevertheless, they tend to be estimated with a low level of precision, such that our conclusions are 
limited with respect to specifying the magnitude of effects (beyond stating that they are probably not zero). 
5.4 Implications for law enforcement
The results suggest a number of important considerations for law enforcement. First, it is clear that 
subsequent analysis is likely to be more fruitfully focused on the predicate offence(s) associated with the 
proceeds of crime action, as most variance in asset level outcomes is in fact at the case level. 
There were, however, also a number of significant asset level findings which are important to consider. Time 
elapsed between asset restraint and final asset status significantly reduces the odds of success, by about a 
third each year. This suggests that the model results may be used to provide an empirical basis for setting 
case review dates based on the expected probability of success. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which graphs 
the estimated probability of success (based on the logistic regression models) over time for the major asset 
types, holding constant other factors in the model. 
Figure 4. Expected success rate by asset type over time
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Further, our results show that residential real estate is significantly less likely to be successfully forfeited or 
disposed than liquid assets, while there was no corresponding effect for commercial real estate. While it is 
unclear based on the data at hand why this is the case, it is an issue that warrants further investigation by the 
Australian Federal Police. In particular, it is possible that this is related to common ownership arrangements 
put in place by criminals where the assets are held by a family member or partner.
The lack of a significant effect for asset value on success (note asset value is distinct from case value) 
reinforces the earlier conclusion that law enforcement should focus most effort on high-value, high-profile 
cases. This is implied because a high-value asset is no more or less likely to be successfully forfeited than a 
low-value asset, but offers a greater return for law enforcement and will inflict substantially more harm on the 
criminal if forfeited.
Lastly, as the data are drawn from a federal source, readers should not assume that the findings apply to all 
Australian jurisdictions, as considerable differences exist in the legislation in place in different states. 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations
The final chapter summarises significant findings and provides our recommendations.
6.1 Measuring the impact of proceeds of crime action
One of the principal aims of our research was to produce an index of the social impact of proceeds of crime 
action. The POCDDI estimates the revenue that would have been available for reinvestment in the criminal 
enterprise in the short to medium term had it not been for successful proceeds of crime action. POCDDI can 
also be described as a measure of the disruption to the criminal enterprise caused by proceeds of crime action.
POCDDI short term  = Profitability x Reinvestment Rate
POCDDI medium term = POCDDI short term
2
Where: 
•	 Profitability is the ratio of revenue to cost.
•	 Reinvestment is the proportion of fund reinvested in further criminal activity.
•	 Short term is the position after one period of criminal activity (around 3 months).
•	 Medium term is the position after two periods of criminal activity (around 6 months).
POCDDI estimates, both short and medium term, were calculated against all individuals involved in the supply 
chain (Overall Model) and then with retail dealers excluded (Distributor Importer Producer Model). It was 
argued that on the basis of the available evidence that proceeds of crime action tends to target wholesale 
dealers and producers/importers (or their employees) rather than retailers.
On those grounds, we recommend the use of the Distributor Importer Producer Model estimates. In terms 
of representing the social value of proceeds of crime action against drug traffickers, we would recommend 
the use of the medium-term estimate of 11.9. The short-term estimate of 3.5 should be considered where 
a conservative estimate is required. In our view, both estimates are conservative as they exclude harms 
associated with investment in the legitimate economy and health and productivity consequences related 
to drug use per se. They also exclude any general deterrent effect that may be associated with successful 
proceeds of crime action.
There are a number of benefits to the use of POCDDI estimates:
•	 First, the POCDDI highlights a key cost to the community associated with illicit drugs. Previous studies have 
identified the direct impact of drug use on, for example, property crime; none have attempted to quantify 
the reinvestment of the profits of drug trafficking into further trafficking. 
•	 Second, it provides law enforcement agencies with a more accurate estimate of the impact of their 
proceeds of crime activities on illicit drug trafficking. In turn, this should improve accountability to both 
government and the community. 
•	 Third, estimates of benefits flowing from law enforcement activities assist in the allocation of internal 
resources and contribute to the case for further funding.
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6.2 Evaluating proceeds of crime action
In terms of evaluating the usefulness of proceeds of crime action in combating drug trafficking, there is a 
complete dearth of studies examining return on investment in Australia and overseas. Return-on-investment 
studies are a widely recognised way to establish the effectiveness of public policy. Through the development 
of the POCDDI, our study provides an empirical basis for measuring the benefits associated with proceeds of 
crime action and provides a starting point for a future return-on-investment study.
6.3 Factors relating to successful proceeds of crime 
investigation
We attempted to identify factors related to successful proceeds of crime investigations using both descriptive 
statistics and advanced modelling techniques.
The value of proceeds of crime in individual investigations was concentrated in the largest cases. The top 
20% of cases contained 87.8% of the total value of proceeds. This observation is consistent with the Pareto 
Principle or 80/20 rule which suggests that 80 percent of the effects come from 20 percent of the causes. It 
also suggests that, in terms of potential impact on the criminal enterprise, law enforcement agencies should 
target the largest cases.
As noted earlier, the amount of data available was not sufficient to develop robust models and our conclusions 
from the statistical analyses should be taken as indicative.
The duration of the financial investigation (as measured by the period from the restraint of an asset to its 
resolution) appeared to be related to the chance of success. For every year that passed, the odds of success 
were reduced by approximately one-third. The observed rate of decline could be useful in assisting financial 
investigation teams to assess the progress of individual cases. Where resources are scarce, it would provide 
useful input into decisions regarding that input. For example, it would be helpful in weighing up whether to 
continue an ongoing case of some duration as opposed to adopting a new case.
We strongly recommend that each jurisdiction develop its own estimate of the relationship between duration 
and success. Our results were developed from Commonwealth data and it is unlikely that the observed 
reduction of one-third per annum represents a universal rule that could be applied across the differing 
circumstance of each jurisdiction.
Our model also suggested that the type of asset restrained affected the chances of a successful outcome. 
Liquid assets and commercial property were more likely to be forfeited than residential property and other 
assets. There is potential to improve the overall effectiveness of financial investigations if the reasons for the 
lower success rate with respect to residential property and other assets could be identified.
6.4 Future directions
There are a number of opportunities to improve our understanding and application of proceeds of crime 
initiatives. The following suggestions are offered for further consideration.
•	 Data quality is always an issue. Information concerning successfully prosecuted investigations is adequate; 
however, there tends to be lower quality with respect to proceeds of crime actions that were discontinued. 
Certainly, there would be benefit in understanding why things do not work as opposed to why they do. 
There is even less information about cases where proceeds of crime action was not initiated. Future 
research could be profitably directed at assessing the potential for levels of proceeds of crime activity above 
the present level. Expert opinion identified lack of available resources as the primary restraint on proceeds of 
crime activity.
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•	 We need to test the boundaries of our work. Our model works at an aggregated level of data. The POCDDI 
itself represents the average disruption to the criminal enterprise brought about by successful investigations. 
The estimated reinvestment rate required to produce a stable revenue flow is also an ‘average’ result. 
More attention could and should be given to the variability inherent in these estimates. One of the reasons 
we limited our estimates of downstream disruption to one and two lags was uncertainty as to longer term 
developments. The issue of variability is an important one and the data quality issues mentioned above also 
impose restrictions on the extension of these findings beyond the data that gave rise to them.
•	 We also need to test our model across a wider range of conditions. A simulation model along the lines of 
Adkins (unpublished) could take into account the long-term effect on the criminal enterprise of (a) arrests 
and drop-outs from the illicit drug trade, (b) changes in market conditions and (c) the impact of highly 
successful participants. Such a model would assist in reinvestment points where future revenues become 
stable and below which they fall under a variety of conditions. Such information could usefully inform 
proceeds of crime policy and operational priorities.
•	 There is a need for further research into the integration of proceeds of crime investigation into the array of 
drug law enforcement techniques. Individual practices differ from full integration financial investigation units 
into the active investigation team to utilising the financial investigation team as a separate expert advisor. It 
would be useful to consider the utility of each approach and whether the best approach is dependent on 
the specific crime under investigation. Similarly, although proceeds of crime ranks along with imprisonment 
as a deterrent to drug crime, the relative efficiency of each approach is not well understood. Some 
consideration of how proceeds of crime activity fits into the overall strategy for combating the illicit drug 
trade would be useful.
•	 It should be noted that the introduction of unexplained wealth provisions could have a significant impact on 
the current findings. It is too early to assess any potential impact and a new study should be commissioned 
at a suitable time. Some agencies were cautious. It was suggested that criminals managing their affairs at 
a distance are unlikely to be affected by the new provisions and that unexplained wealth investigations may 
be resource intensive, reducing their appeal to investigators.
•	 The literature on proceeds of crime action relating to illegal drug trafficking is scant. The role of bodies like 
the National Drug Law Enforcement Fund in funding and disseminating such research is crucial. It is also 
crucial that research undertaken within individual jurisdictions is made available, preferably publicly but at 
the very least within the law enforcement community. In the course of our project, we have become aware 
of some such research being undertaken ‘privately’ in jurisdictions. We need to protect sensitive operational 
detail from criminal eyes; we also need to share best practice with our colleagues.
•	 A number of experts raised concerns over the proportion of proceeds of crime that are transferred 
overseas and thus lost to the Australian economy. This issue was outside our scope but is of such potential 
importance that a formal study into the issue is warranted.
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Attachment A: The illicit drug market  
in Australia
This attachment provides a broad, descriptive overview of the Australian illicit drug market. It considers the 
extent of the market and provides a summary of key statistics from publicly available sources.
In understanding the state of Australian illicit drug markets, it is first necessary to define what is meant by the 
constituent terms ‘Australian’, ‘illicit drug’ and ‘markets’. By ‘Australian’ we mean drugs that are ultimately 
sold and consumed in Australia, while recognising that a great deal of the earlier phases of production and 
wholesale distribution may take place overseas at least for some drugs. ‘Illicit drug’ is operationally defined to 
include cannabis, amphetamines, ecstasy, cocaine and heroin. While we recognise that there are many other 
illicit drugs, these five are most widely consumed and problematic, making them a natural focus of attention. 
Moreover, due to their seriousness, there is a greater availability of data and research regarding these drugs.
The last term ‘markets’ is more contentious but is defined here to encompass the relationships, processes, 
conditions and actors involved in the production, distribution and consumption of a product or set of related 
products. Importantly, parts of a market are responsive to changes in other parts of the market (for example 
where increases in the price of a product lead to reduced consumption of that product). Thus, ‘Australian Illicit 
drug markets’ is defined as including the primary producers, distributors (including importers), retail vendors 
and consumers involved in cannabis, amphetamines, ecstasy, cocaine and heroin, as well as the set of 
relationships that link them together. 
Data relevant to Australian illicit drug markets are naturally difficult to obtain owing to the clandestine nature of 
much of the activities that constitute the markets. Moore (2006) summarises the major available data sources 
and the strengths and limitations of each. Of particular concern is the suitability of sampling procedures used 
across the range of major studies. Convenience samples of drug users are used in the Illicit Drug Reporting 
System (IDRS) and the Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System (EDRS), while the Illicit Drug Data Report 
(IDDR) is based on police sources and does not report on the number of cases used to obtain reported 
estimates or the source of the estimates (Australian Crime Commission 2006). To the extent that the prices 
paid and purities of drugs in these samples are not representative of the broader Australian illicit drug market, 
they will provide misestimates. Conversely, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare’s (AIHW) National 
Drug Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS), which employs a random sample of households, does not include 
homeless or institutionalised persons, who are likely to have higher rates of substance abuse. Consequently, 
it is important to acknowledge that the estimates reported here are likely to be subject to a higher than usual 
degree of error.  
The remainder of this chapter summarises the available evidence on a number of important variables relevant 
to Australian illicit drug markets, including price, purity, number of users and total consumption among 
other variables. First, an overview of patterns and trend in illicit drug use as a whole is provided. Then, more 
detailed summaries are provided by each of the major drug types listed above: cannabis, amphetamines, 
ecstasy, cocaine and heroin. Where available, we use raw data reported in one of the primary series. Several 
higher order estimates (such as total funding and consumption weight) are, however, taken from Adkins 
(unpublished), who combines raw data to estimate quantities which are unavailable in raw form. 
Overview and trends 
Available evidence suggests that participation in illicit drug markets is quite widespread and is particularly 
pronounced in younger age groups. The 2010 NDSHS indicates that approximately 14.7% of persons aged 
14 years and over had used some kind of illicit drug at least once in the previous year (AIHW 2011). This 
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represents a significant, albeit slight, increase from the 2007 NDSHS, which found 13.4% of persons had 
used some kind of illicit drug in the past year. Nearly forty percent (39.8%) of respondents indicated that they 
had used some kind of illicit drug in their lifetime in the 2010 NDSHS. 
Adkins (unpublished) findings reinforce the view of illicit drug markets as substantial in size, suggesting that total 
funding for the cannabis, heroin, cocaine, amphetamines and ecstasy markets was around $10.8 billion in 2008. 
The AIHW (2011) also reports variations in the level of participation by state/territory and age. Of the various 
states and territories, the Northern Territory had the highest rate of illicit drug use, with 21.3% of persons aged 
14 and over reporting illicit drug use at least once in the past year. Western Australia also displayed a higher 
rate of illicit drug use at 18.6%, while the other states ranged from 12% (Tasmania) to 15.1% (Queensland). 
With respect to age, the highest level of participation in the illicit drug market was for persons aged 20–29 and 
18–19, of whom approximately 27.5% and 25.1% respectively had used illicit drugs on at least one occasion 
in the past year. The next highest rate of use was among persons aged 30–39 at 18.8%, with older groups 
exhibiting progressively lower rates of use. Ten percent of the youngest group aged 12–17 had used illicit 
drugs in the past year. 
As noted above, data from the NDSHS indicate that use as a percentage of the population aged 14 or over 
increased between 2007 and 2010. However, this is contrary to a longer term decline in use from a peak of 
21.9% in 1998 to 13.4% in 2007 (AIHW 2011). It is unclear then, whether the observed increase from 2007–
2010 represents the beginning of an upwards trend or a temporary deviation from the existing trend. 
Cannabis
Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit drug in Australia. The most recent report from the NDSHS (AIHW 
2011) found that 1.9 million Australians (10.3%) aged 14 years or over had used the drug in the last 12 
months; a significant increase from 1.6 million (9.1%) in 2007 and the first increase since 1998. Currently, 
males are more likely to use than females (12.9% compared with 7.7%) and the 18–29 age group has the 
highest rates of recent use, at 21.3%. Of those who reported using cannabis recently (in the last 12 months), 
most reported that they used once or twice a year (34.7%), although 13% reported that they used every day 
and 20.9% at least once a week. Users aged 40 years or more were the most likely to use regularly with 
17.6% reporting that they used every day and 27% that they used at least once a week.
According to estimates produced by Adkins (unpublished), around 230 tonnes of cannabis were consumed 
in Australia in 2008, at around $28 per gram, although prices varied significantly between states. Indeed, in 
2009–10, it is reported by the ACC (2011b) in their Illicit Drugs Data Report (IDDR) that the price of cannabis 
in Australia ranged between $20–50 per gram. Adkins also estimates the national profit margins for producers 
and distributors of cannabis, which when combined totals around $2,175 million. The volume of cannabis 
seized by law enforcement in the 2010–11 year was around 5.45 tonnes, according to the IDDR (Australian 
Crime Commission (ACC) 2012).
Most cannabis consumed in Australia is produced domestically, with certain prominent criminal groups being 
quite established in the large-scale cultivation and distribution of the drug (ACC 2011c). Despite the existence 
of such groups, cannabis markets are recognised to be heterogeneous with various actors operating at 
various capacities. This information led the ACC, in their Organised Crime in Australia Report, to state that “[t]
he cultivation and distribution of cannabis in Australia is a large-scale, diverse and entrenched illicit market—
resulting in cannabis remaining readily available” (ACC 2011c, p65). 
Amphetamines
Of those Australians aged 14 years and over, 2.1% had used amphetamines in the preceding 12 month 
period, according the 2010 NDSHS (AIHW 2011). This indicates a significant decrease from 3.7% in 1998. 
Males were more likely to use than females (2.5% compared with 1.7%) and those aged 20–29 were the most 
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likely age group to have used amphetamines. Of those who used, most reported using once or twice a year 
(48.8%), with a decreasing proportion of users falling into each more frequent use category. 
Approximately 1.6 tonnes of amphetamines were consumed by 1.9 million users in 2008 (Adkins 
unpublished). The total profit margin for the importation/production and distribution of amphetamines retail 
value in 2009–10, up from $250–600 in 2008–09. Non-crystal methylamphetamine ranged from $100–1,000 
per gram, up from $100–300 in 2008–09; and amphetamine (the least pure form) ranged from $50–100 per 
gram, up from $30–80 in 2008–09.
Most amphetamines consumed in Australia are locally produced in clandestine laboratories, although the 
precursor chemicals required to produce them are largely imported (ACC 2011). Thus, the amphetamine 
market is understood as constituting “extensive domestic and international criminal networks” (ACC 2011c, 
p57). At present amphetamines remain readily available, despite an increase in the number of seizures 
and tighter regulation around the importation and general availability of precursor chemicals. Furthermore, 
although the number of detections at the Australian border rose between 2008–09 and 2009–10, the actual 
quantity of amphetamines detected has decreased by 84%, from 416.5kg to 66.7kg. The ACC notes that 
some jurisdictions have discerned volatility in the amphetamines market with high prices existing alongside 
relatively low quality.
MDMA/Ecstasy
The estimated number of Australians who had recently used MDMA in 2010 had decreased from 600,000 
(3.5%) in 2007 to 550,000 (3%) (AIHW 2011). Like the other illicit drugs discussed here, a greater proportion 
of males than females used, with rates of 3.6% and 2.3% respectively. The age group most likely to use, with 
a proportion of 9.9%, was those aged 20–29 years. A very small proportion of those who used did so daily or 
weekly (3.3%), with the majority reporting that they used once or twice a year (53.10%) or every few months 
(31.40%). Notably, users aged 18–19 years used much more frequently than all other age groups, with 45% 
using at least once a month; less than 10% of all other age groups used this frequently, with the exception of 
20–29 year olds (16.8%).
In 2008, the estimated quantity of MDMA consumed was around 3.3 tonnes with an average retail price 
of $358 per gram (Adkins unpublished) or around $10–50 per tablet (ACC 2011b). This equates to a profit 
margin of approximately $723 million for MDMA producers and distributors taken as a whole. Approximately 
1.7 tonnes of the drug were kept from reaching the market through seizures in 2008.
Limited production of MDMA has been detected in Australia to date, which suggests that most MDMA on 
the Australian market is imported (ACC 2011c). General purity of MDMA tablets has been decreasing, due 
to a global shortage in key precursor chemicals, which has meant a quite unstable market in Australia since 
2010, although it is redeveloping slowly. Purity estimates for MDMA are not available for 2010 but in 2008, it 
was predicted to be around 34% on average (Adkins unpublished). The ACC believe that the continued poor 
quality of MDMA tablets may serve to raise demand for other illicit drugs. 
In interpreting the statistics presented above, it is important to be aware that ‘ecstasy tablets’ may in practice 
contain a wide range of different (unrelated) substances and that this issue may be exacerbated by the 
tendency for self-reported drug use to be unreliable, particularly when it may not be clear to the user what the 
chemical composition of the drugs they are taking is. 
Cocaine
According the NDSHS 2010, rates of cocaine use have been increasing since 2004 (AIHW 2011). In 2010, 
this trend continued with 2.1% of those over the age 14 reporting having used cocaine in the preceding 12 
months, up from 1.6% in 2007. Males were again more likely to use than females, with rates of 2.7% and 
1.5% respectively. People in the 20–29 year age group were the most likely to use, with a rate of 6.5%. The 
majority (60.8%) of those who had used cocaine in the last 12 months reported using it once or twice a year. 
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In 2008, the estimated amount of cocaine consumed in Australia was approximately 6.8 tonnes at an average 
price of around $352 per gram and with average retail purity being relatively high at 53% (Adkins unpublished). 
Based on Adkins’ predictions this would have resulted in a total profit of around $2,568 million being made 
through the importation and distribution of cocaine. The retail price of cocaine has remained relatively stable 
since 2008, ranging between $250–500 per gram in 2009–10, despite the fact that the amount of cocaine 
removed from the market through seizures declined from 591.9kg in 2008–09 to 394.8kg (ACC 2011b).
The majority of cocaine consumed in Australia is imported from North and South America. Although there are 
an increased number of transhipping countries in Africa and South East Asia, the majority of cocaine detected 
in Australia continues to be imported directly from North and South America (ACC 2011c). According to the 
ACC, the availability of cocaine is increasing in Australia—and it appears to remain in demand despite the fact 
that it is significantly more expensive here than in many overseas countries. Nevertheless, the ACC state that 
“[i]t is difficult to accurately assess and measure the cocaine market in Australia because of the relative lack of 
data compared with other illicit drug markets” (2011c, p57).
Heroin
Very few Australians aged 14 years and over reported using heroin in the last 12 months in 2010, with a rate 
of 0.2% (AIHW 2011). This rate had not changed from that observed in 2007. There appeared to be very 
little gender difference in reported recent heroin use with 0.3% of males and 0.2% of females reporting using. 
Males were twice as likely to report having ever used heroin though, with a proportion of 1.9%, compared with 
0.9% of females. Information on heroin use by age group is not disaggregated from injecting drug use more 
generally in the NDSHS. 
Adkins (unpublished) predicts that 1.2 tonnes of heroin was consumed in 2008 by a population of around 
64,000 heroin users. The estimated price per gram of heroin in 2008 was around $408. From Adkins’ models, 
the total profit margin for heroin importation and distribution in 2008 was approximately $815 million and the 
average purity of heroin in 2008 was 28%. Around 375kg of the drug was seized by state and federal police in 
2010–11 (ACC 2012).
Most heroin consumed in Australia is imported, although a very small amount is produced locally. Historically, 
South West Asia (predominantly Afghanistan) has been the primary international source of heroin and this has 
been true for Australia as well (ACC 2011c). Yet since 2006, the production of heroin in South East Asia has 
been reportedly increasing quite dramatically. The ACC (2011c, p64) therefore predict that “[w]ith production 
of opium in South East Asia continuing to rise, the availability of heroin in Australia is expected to continue to 
increase slowly, particularly in the major capital cities”.
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Attachment B: Note on the price 
elasticity of illicit drugs
There is very little recent work that addresses the price elasticity of illicit drugs, despite its importance for 
law enforcement techniques (such as seizures) aiming to reduce illicit drug consumption by driving up price 
(Chalmers al 2009). One exception is Adkins who adjusts her model of illicit drug consumption for the own-
price elasticity of demand for each drug and the cross-price elasticity of demand between drugs; though she 
does not report the magnitude of these elasticity’s or the algorithm by which they were computed (p. 42). In 
terms of own-price elasticity, each of the drugs discussed in Attachment A are considered elastic, except for 
amphetamines which is considered inelastic. In terms of cross-price elasticity, amphetamines are seen as a 
compliment to each of the other four, and ecstasy is a compliment to all except amphetamines. In the case of 
amphetamines, heroin, cannabis and cocaine are all taken to be compliments. Heroin, cannabis and cocaine 
are considered substitutionary drugs to all others, with exception again of amphetamines which has only 
ecstasy as a substitute.
Chalmers et al. (2009) also investigate price elasticity but for amphetamines and heroin only. They employ 
a methodology derived from behavioural economics that has a sample of participants indicate which drug 
they would purchase and in what quantity in a contrived experimental setting. Here participants are given a 
hypothetical budget for drug purchases and a list of drug prices across which the price of amphetamines or 
heroin is varied to allow for elasticity to occur. Participants were drawn in a non-random manner based on 
their contact with one of a set of four agencies in New South Wales offering a needle and syringe programme. 
The own-price elasticity of amphetamines was observed to be elastic by Chalmers et al (2009) with 1.87% 
and 1.77% reductions in consumption per 1% increase in price for those dependent and non-dependent on 
amphetamines, respectively—a result that contradicts Adkins’ assessment. The own-price elasticity of heroin 
was too seen to be elastic with reductions of 1.55% and 2.67% in consumption per 1% increase in price for 
dependent and non-dependent users, respectively. In terms of the cross-price elasticity of amphetamines, 
dependent users tended to substitute into with heroin and pharmaceutical opioids, whereas non-dependent 
users substituted mainly with heroin and cocaine. In regards to the cross-price elasticity of heroin, dependent 
users substituted with amphetamines, benzodiazepines and pharmaceutical opioids. Non-dependent users 
were observed to substitute into pharmaceutical opioids, though the cross-price elasticity for this was <1%. 
Cocaine was observed to be a complement for heroin for both groups, though this appeared to be the case 
more for dependent users than non-dependent.
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Attachment C: Excerpts from Adkins 
G (unpublished), A Simulation Model 
of the Illicit Drug Industry in Australia
The primary aim of this research has been to develop a simulation model of the illicit drug industry across 
each of the Australian States and Territories.  In this connection, the illicit drug industry is comprised of the 
markets for heroin, amphetamines, cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy.  By placing the components of the system 
into sectors relating to demand, supply, law enforcement and the community, the fundamental nature of the 
interactions between the components of the system have been modelled over the period 2000 to 2008 (p.7).
The Supply Sector examines the supply of illicit drugs, with the underlying assumption being that supply 
progresses through a distribution chain, comprising production/importation, wholesale distribution and retail 
sales.  The Supply Sector incorporates pricing, purity and consuming practices of providers, gross revenues, 
operating costs, and expected net profits (p.8).
The supply sector
As noted earlier, the Supply Sector examines the supply of illicit products from an industry perspective.  
While the supply of illicit products is assumed to progress through a varying number of industry levels, 
dependent upon the type of drug sold, in this model, three industry levels are indicated.  That is, Production/
Importation, Distribution (Wholesale) and Retail.  The choice of these three broad levels has been made in 
order to add a degree of simplification to the model.  Simplification also aids in isolating the flow-on effects 
of law enforcement activities and other policy actions, and determining the levels of profit etc.  To this extent, 
the model has been designed to illustrate the three entities separately, but, nevertheless, linked, within the 
distribution chain.  
The Supply Sector comprises four processing stages, which address the following objectives:
•	 Identify industry structures.
•	 Identify/estimate pricing practices within/across each industry level.
•	 Identify/estimate profits at each industry level.
•	 Estimate law enforcement initiated risk premiums attaching to the various supply levels.
•	 Identify/estimate the likely changes in price due to risk premiums and costs of supply.
55
Attachment C: Excerpts from Adkins G (unpublished), A Simulation Model of the Illicit Drug Industry in Australia
Figure 5: Supply Sector Stage 1: Supply
Stage S1 describes supply at each of the importation/production, distribution and retail levels.  The amount of 
product flowing through the system at each level is calculated, taking into account purity levels, consumption 
practices of supply participants and seizure activities.  In stage S2, price and purity calculations are 
undertaken and in stage S3, operating costs to suppliers are estimated.  Stage S4 incorporates calculations 
undertaken in stages S1 through S3 to estimate gross revenues and expected profits for each of the 
three supply levels. Processing stage S1 is shown in Figure 5, followed by a summary, definition and brief 
discussion of the key variables (pp. 34-34).
Supply
As previously noted, the Supply Sector examines the supply of illicit products from an industry perspective. 
In this connection, the supply of illicit products is assumed to progress through a number of industry levels, 
represented in this model as production/importation, distribution (wholesale) and dealing (retail).  In order to 
isolate the flow-on effects of law enforcement activities and other policy actions, the model has been designed 
to illustrate these separate and distinct entities within the distribution chain.  Final year model outputs of each of 
the processing stages for supply are provided for the key variables, as indicated in Tables 11 and 12.
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Table 11 Supply
 Heroin Amphetamines Cannabis Cocaine Ecstasy
Producer/Importer
Quantity Sold (kgs) 
- Unadjusted 1,109.70 1,481.42 226,936.23 6,644.21 2,570.89
- Elasticity Adj. 1,109.83 1,482.64 226,925.54 6,644.35 2,570.44
- UN Adj. 3,327.48 5,224.57 377,993.62 5,592.13 4,831.51
Gross Revenue 
- Unadjusted $4,131,898 $15,484,313 $444,256,201 $7,533,453 $212,287,651
- Elasticity Adj. $4,132,382 $15,497,065 $444,235,288 $7,533,613 $212,250,602 
- UN Adj. $12,389,650 $54,609,014 $739,970,041 $6,340,565 $398,955,903 
Expected Profit
- Unadjusted $3,882,550 $14,574,953 $433,027,678 $7,262,159 $183,986,468
- Elasticity Adj. $3,883,005 $14,586,955 $433,007,294 $7,262,313 $183,954,358 
- UN Adj. $11,641,973 $51,401,944 $721,267,386 $6,112,229 $345,768,994 
Distributor
Quantity Sold (kgs) 
- Unadjusted 1,648.52 1,907.73 200,171.34 7,697.16 2,704.73
- Elasticity Adj. 2,111.15 3,628.42 171,943.98 7,486.69 4,336.20
- UN Adj. 5,921.51 12,653.05 279,900.79 7,224.60 7,916.23
Gross Revenue
- Unadjusted $495,518,784 $380,096,235 $1,345,407,349 $1,821,372,709 $432,095,989 
- Elasticity Adj. $519,860,925 $362,597,750 $1,296,623,488 $1,881,646,731 $448,322,439 
- UN Adj. $1,514,106,520 $1,215,701,897 $2,203,305,133 $1,615,400,740 $804,724,906 
Expected Profit
- Unadjusted $448,481,458 $327,026,214 $945,524,979 $1,660,748,750 $230,146,643 
- Elasticity Adj. $470,513,580 $311,962,540 $911,240,628 $1,715,708,160 $239,227,834 
- UN Adj. $1,370,380,110 $1,045,903,786 $1,548,438,096 $1,472,942,294 $428,422,502 
Dealer
Quantity Sold (kgs)
- Unadjusted 1,995.27 3,878.43 173,537.82 7,613.22 4,189.69
- Elasticity Adj. 2,062.27 3,453.13 170,401.16 8,327.79 4,903.62
- UN Adj. 5,982.49 13,287.94 287,105.49 6,702.22 7,942.56
Gross Revenue
- Unadjusted $515,912,751 $905,610,653 $2,521,097,011 $597,632,354 $1,090,314,100 
- Elasticity Adj. $550,530,242 $839,294,944 $2,530,352,848 $497,033,144 $1,133,091,274 
- UN Adj. $1,487,471,116 $2,975,026,825 $4,009,838,270 $680,908,619 $2,073,461,835 
Expected Profit
- Unadjusted $430,772,089 $267,832,720 $1,502,626,208 $463,751,120 $739,323,484 
- Elasticity Adj. $461,555,473 $211,617,110 $1,637,771,254 $369,026,287 $780,385,876 
- UN Adj. $1,232,956,887 $986,254,546 $2,176,779,319 $557,827,005 $1,444,517,837 
(pp. 85-86)
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Table 12 Prices
 Heroin Amphetamines Cannabis Cocaine Ecstasy
Importer/Producer
Producer Price (per gram) $3.42 $9.64 $1.94 $1.10 $63.86
Distributor
Wholesale Price (per gram) $302.55 $205.37 $8.88 $237.48 $219.63
Seizure Adjusted Wholesale 
Prices (per gram ) $302.89 $206.73 $8.92 $237.58 $220.46
Percentage Difference 0.11% 0.66% 0.45% 0.04% 0.38%
Dealer
Retail Price (per gram) $500.94 $334.42 $24.71 $318.31 $399.63
Seizure Adjusted Retail 
Prices (per gram) $508.82 $335.18 $24.81 $318.70 $402.56
Percentage Difference 1.57% 0.23% 0.40% 0.12% 0.73%
(p. 89)

